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ABSTRACT

Identifying the Bases for Gender Differences in Guilt and Shame

by

R. Shawn Edmondson, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2002

Major Professor : Dr. Tamara J. Ferguson
Department: Psychology

Gender differences are frequently revealed on the popular TOSCA-2 measure
of guilt- and shame-proneness.

These gender differences could reflect biases in the

eliciting conditions that participants evaluate and confounds between them . A new
instrument , the Gender Relevant Test of Self-Conscious Affect (GR-TOSCA), was
developed to eliminate these confounds, thereby introducing a gender-sensitive, and
therefore more valid, measure of guilt and shame proneness. The psychometric
integrity of the new instrument , hypotheses regarding condition-specific gender
differences in the two emotions, and relationships of guilt- and shame-proneness
scores to gender role endorsement were examined in a sample of undergraduate
students (93 men and 109 women). Encouraging evidence was produced for the
reliability and validity of the GR-TOSCA , but the hypothesized gender differences in
guilt and shame proneness were not found. Several possibilities for these results are
explored , including the possibility of biases in the research procedure.
(148 pages)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Guilt and shame have long been subjects of the work of poets and bards , but
empirical investigation of these emotions has flourished only in recent decades. These
emotions have been conceptualized as distinct clusters of behaviors , feelings, and
cognitions that serve important intrapersonal and interpersonal regulatory function s.
They are intertwined with social life as they depend on socialization for their
development , require a (real or imagined) social context to be experienced, and inevitably
communicate appreciations of self and others (Fischer & Tangney, 1995). Shame is a
negative evaluation of one 's entire self and originates from an individual 's perceptions
that he or she possesses an "unwanted identity. " Guilt, on the other hand , is a reaction to
a specific event, failure, or misdeed , reflecting a person 's perception that a person or an
entity has been disadvantaged in some way as a result (Ferguson & Eyre, 2000; Lewis,
1971; Olthof, 1996). These emotions also are observed as action tendencie s that serve
functional purposes such as communicating information about the status of one's social
relations (Barrett , 1995; Gilbert & Andrews , 1998).
Although much of the research involving guilt and shame has focused on these
emotions' relationship to psychopathology and well-being (e.g., Goldberg , 1991; Kohut ,
1971; Lansky , 1987; Morrison , 1989; Morrison , 1987; Nathanson , 1987), gender
differences in guilt and shame have become a growing area of interest. 1

I

Throughout the thesis, and in agreement with terminological distinctions drawn in the social sciences
literature, the term "gender" is used to refer to a person's self-identified role as a man or woman .
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Social scientists have theoriz ed that women are more likely to experience and report guilt
and shame than men (Brody , 1996; Lewis, 1992; Reimer , 1997; Tangney , 1994).
Numerous scientists maintain that the gender difference in shame occurs becau se women
are socially and economically repressed in Western society (e.g., Brody & Hall , 1993 ;
Fischer , 1993; Fischer & Jansz , 1995; Harris & Schwab , 1990; Hochschild , 1983; Lutz ,
1990). It has been argued that this social and economic repression causes women to
experience a greater number of (or more serious) "unwanted identities, " which are the
primary feelings that underlie shame (Ferguson , Stegge , Miller , & Olsen , 1999).
Therefore , women have many more opportunities to experience shame than men . In
terms of the anticipated gender difference in guilt, social scientists have often noted that
women are stereotyped as interpersonally sensitive , nurturing caregivers (Hill & Lynch ,
1983; Williams & Best, 1990). A different expectation exists for men , who are
stereotyped as dominant , competitive , and assertive (Anti ll, 1987; Blank , 1993; Block ,
1983; Hoffman , 1975; Williams & Best, 1990). If this is true , then women sho uid find it
more difficult than men to avoid feeling as though they have disadvantaged other s, which
some assert is the primary basis for feelings of guilt (Ferguson & Eyre, 2000 ; Olthof ,
1996).
Empirical investigation of these hypothesized gender differences in guilt and
shame has produced contradictory findings. Research using what is known as the
"scenario-based assessment paradigm " has , in fact, often found this predicted gender
difference in guilt and shame proneness. Two commonly used assessments of this type
are the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner , & Gramzow , 1992)
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and its successor the TOSCA-2 (Tangney, Ferguson, Wagner, Crowley, & Gramzow,
l 996a), which present short, hypothetical scenarios that participants imagine have
happened to them. Participants are asked to rate how likely it is that they would exhibit a
guilt or shame-keyed response. Their total scores on these responses are used as a
measure of their disposition to experience guilt and shame, otherwise known as guilt and
shame proneness.
Assessments of guilt and shame that do not rely on scenarios, such as the Personal
Feeling Questionnaire 2 (PFQ-2; Harder & Zalma , 1990) yield different findings. The
PFQ-2 presents respondents with a list of shame- and guilt-related affective descriptors
(e.g. , for guilt, "regret " and "remorse"), which participants rate in terms of how
continuously they experience each. Frequently, on this type of measure , the predicted
tendencies for women to report greater guilt and shame than men are not found (Ferguson
& Eyre, 2000; Ferguson, et al., 1999; Harder , 1990; Sorensen, Ferguson , & Eyre, 1997) .

In fact, sometimes scores on the PFQ-2 reveal the opposite trends , with greater guilt and
especially shame proneness being revealed in men.
Why are there inconsistencies in the nature of the gender differences found in
guilt or shame proneness across various assessment devices ? One explanation focuses on
the lack of gender bias apparent in certain assessments (such as the PFQ-2) in contrast to
the potentially gender-biased nature of the situations used in scenario-based assessments
(such as the TOSCA-2) . Ferguson, Eyre, and Ashbaker (2000) argue that gender
differences are not usually found on non scenario-based measures like the PFQ-2 because
these measures ask the participant to recall from their own life history situations in which
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they experienced the emotions. Men and women are likely to differentially recall the
types of situations from their personal histories that represent gender-specific threats to
their identities.

In contrast, Ferguson and her colleagues argue that women score as more

shame-prone on the TOSCA-2 because the scenarios presented are inherently more
threatening to the identities of women. The situations are more threatening to women 's
identities because the TOSCA-2 consists mainly of situations that relatively seriously
disadvantage others. Disadvantaging others is an unwanted identity for women and is
contrary to society's expectations of appropriate behavior for women. It is these
perceptions of possessing an unwanted identity and disadvantaging others that could
contribute to their greater tendencies to express guilt and shame on the TOSCA-2.

The

greater guilt and shame proneness scores of women on the TOSCA-2 could therefore
simply be an artifact created by the gender-biased nature of the scenarios presented .
Based on the present state of the empirical literature , it is difficult to discern
whether gender differences in guilt and shame are simply anifacts of a particular
assessment paradigm or represent genuine gender differences in the two emotion
dispositions.

The difficulty arises because most of the situations in the TOSCA-2

represent a confound between disadvantaging others (the guilt-inducing condition) and
unwanted identities (the shame-inducing condition for women). One way to ascertain
whether gender differences in either emotion are real or an artifact is to develop a new
measure of guilt and shame proneness. Because the scenario-based TOSCA paradigm is
thought to be the best available method to measure guilt and shame proneness (cf.
Tangney , 1995) , this new measure would best be modeled after its most recent iteration,
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the TOSCA-2. Unlike the TOSCA-2, however , the new measure would include scenarios
that do not confound the condition of disadvantaging others with the condition of
presenting additional unwanted identities .
The research proposed in this thesis has three primary goals: (a) to develop a new
scenario-based measure of guilt and shame proneness that adequately represents domains
of unwanted identities relevant to men and women, (b) to develop a new scenario-based
measure of guilt and shame that does not consistently confound the guilt-eliciting
(disadvantaging others) with the shame-eliciting (unwanted identities) condition, and (c)
to provide evidence for the validity of the interpretations made using this measure. Us ing
this new measure , the proposed research will then test several predictions regarding
gender differences in guilt and shame proneness.

6
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The review of the literature is organized into several sections. Readers unfamiliar
with the literature on guilt and shame often express two questions. Invariably , the first
question posed is "Is there really a difference between these two emotions?"
Conceptualizations

of differences between guilt and shame are reviewed in the first

section of this chapter. The second question consistently asked is "W hy is it important to
differentiate between the two emotions?" which is the focus of the second section. The
third section of the literature review will briefly outline the theoretical literature in which
it is often argued that women are more likely to experience guilt and shame because of
the different socialization histories and gender stereotypes prevalent in modern Western
society . This is followed in the fourth section by a summary of studies that have
empirica lly investigated gender differences in the two emotions .

Conceptualizations of Differences Between
Guilt and Shame

Guilt and shame have appeared in scientific literature at least as far back as
Charles Darwin's The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals in 1896 . These
emotions were also prominent in Sigmund Freud's work, in which he emphasized guilt's
connection to psychopathology and shame as a reaction formation against sexual
impulses (1905/1953).

But Darwin and Freud, as well as most early writers on the

subject, failed to consistently and adequately distinguish between the two emotions.
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Prior to the influential writings of Helen Block Lewis in 1971, the words guilt and shame
were commonly used interchangeably by clinicians and researchers alike (two exceptions
include Lynd, 1958 and Piers & Singer , 1953). During the past three decades , social
scientists have reached a consensus that the two emotions are similar on several
dimensions . For example , guilt and shame are both socially constructed emotions
(Barrett , 1995; Baumeister , Stillwell , & Heatherton , 1995) and involve negative
appreciations of the self or the self in relationship to others. But more recently , social
scientists have argued that there is good reason to differentiate between the two emotions
(Lewis , 1971, 1987; Tangney , Wagner , & Gram zow , 1992) .
In her seminal writings , H. B. Lewis ( 1971) focused on the role of the self in
differentiating guilt from shame. She described shame as a negative evaluation of one ' s
entire self. Recent theories of shame incorporate this global evaluative aspect of sham e
as well (Barrett & Campos , 1987; Lewis , Sullivan , Stanger , & Weiss , 1989 ; Nathan son ,
1987; Tangne y, 1990). Other theorists have expanded upon this idea by suggesting that
the basis of the emotion is an individual ' s perception that he or she possesses , or could be
perceived to possess , an "unwanted identity " (Ferguson & Eyre , 2000 ; Olthof , 1996) .
From these perspectives , any action -- real or contemplated --

can promote a shame

response as long as the person appraises the action as reflecting negatively on his or her
character. Thus , shame can be associated with moral transgressions or defeats , but is not
restricted to these behaviors and need not involve causing or contemplating causing harm
to anyone. Shame appears to often occur because one ' s actions have revealed some
dreaded flaw in the self (be it in the realm of size and strength, dexterity and physical
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skill, dependence versus independence, cognitive ability , communication , sense of self ,
gender identity and sexuality, or interpersonal skills , (cf. Nathanson , 1987). These
revelations of one ' s dreaded self involve feelings of passivity , of being scrutinized , being
"small ," and a general sense of helplessness (Barrett & Campos, 1987; Lewis 1971, 1987;
Lewis , 1992; Nathanson, 1987). Presumably because of the socially evaluative nature of
shame, its action tendencies include the desire to hide or escape, lowering of the head ,
covering the face or eyes, and other behavior s that represent attempts to minimize real or
imagined social judgment.
Whereas H. B. Lewi s conceptualized shame as focusing on the inadequacies of
the global self and unwanted identities, she (and others since) viewed guilt as a reaction
to a specific event , failure , or misdeed (Barrett & Campos , 1987; Lewis , 1971; Lewis et
al., 1989; Nathanson , 1987; Tangney , 1990). Guilt has been more specifically defined as
the emotion arising from the perception that the self or another person or entity has been
disadvantaged in some way (Ferguson & Eyre , 2000 ; Olthof , 1996). These
conceptualizations of guilt emphasize that the emotion leaves the sense of self-worth and
competence intact. Moreover , whereas shame is usually associated with inaction and
passivity , guilty individuals often feel compelled to make reparative action to correct or
repair the damage they have done or imagine themselves as having done . Although
guilty feelings prototypically arise from immoral or unethical deeds, they can also result
from behaviors or events that are perceived to cause harm even though the harm was not
necessarily intended nor even a part of the guilty person's goal structure (e.g. , receiving a
bonus at work when one's coworkers do not; doing better than one's friend on an
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important exam). Guilt , therefore , involves the appraisal that one has failed to undertake
some action or actually undertook an action that somehow was associated with
disadvantaging another or even oneself.

Importance of Differentiating Between
Guilt and Shame

The primary reason that psychologists believe it important to differentiate
between guilt and shame is that the two emotions may play distinct roles in the
development of pathognomic symptoms. The exact nature of either emotions' role in
psychopathology is still unclear and many controversies abound in this literature. For
exa mple, although theorists such as Freud (1905/1953, 1917/ 1957, 1924/1961) heavily
emphasized guilt's association with psychopathology , critics have argued these
conclusions are based on an inconsistent (or nonexistent) distinction between guilt and
shame (Tangney, 1995). In fact, guilt and shame have been shown to be differentially
related to indices of (mal)adjustment when measured using one very popular instrument - the TOSCA (Tangney, Wagner , Gromzow , 1992) or its successor, the TOSCA-2
(Tangney, Wagner , Hill-Barlow , Marschall , Gramzow, 1996). For example, using the
TOSCA-2, Tangney and her colleagues have shown that shame proneness is predictive of
depression and other psychological symptoms of maladjustment (e.g. , Burggraf &
Tangney , 1990; Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Tangney , Wagner, Burggraf , Gran1Zow, &
Fletcher, 1991; Tangney et al., 1992). Shame has been shown to be a central component
of depression , narcissism , bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia (Goldberg , 1991; Kohut ,
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1971; Lansky, 1987; Morrison, 1989; Morrison, 1987; Nathanson , 1987). However , guilt
proneness -- at least as operationalized by measures like the TOSCAs -- is not strongly
related to the same indices, especially when these scores are residualized for their
association with shame proneness. The fact that shame and guilt are differentially
predictive of psychological maladjustment emphasizes the importance of validly
distinguishing between the two emotions .

Theorized Gender Differences in
Guilt and Shame

It has been argued that socialization and gender roles in modern Western society
should result in gender differences in guilt and shame proneness (e.g., Fabes & Martin ,
1991 ). These stereotypes indicate that women are expected to be loving , caring
individuals , interpersonally sensitive and connected to others (Williams & Best , 1990).
Such expectations could make women particularly vulnerable to seeing themselve s as
disadvantaging others and it is these perceptions of disadvantaging that can underlie
feelings of guilt. Women and young girls are also rejected by their peers for being
aggressive (Crick, Casas, & Mosher, 1997), and mothers actively encourage boys more
than girls to retaliate aggressively when provoked by angry peers (Brody , 1996; Greif ,
Alvarez, & Ulman, 1981; Zahn-Waxler , 1995). These assertions suggest that females
across the lifespan are more likely to feel guilt because many are encouraged to assume
care-taking roles, with aggression towards others or harming or disadvantaging others
being clear violations of these roles.
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Males, in contrast, are less likely to feel guilty than women because it is relatively
more socially acceptable for them to disadvantage others. There is a substantial amount
of literature that suggests men and boys are socialized and expected to be aggressive,
achievement oriented, autonomous, and active (e.g., Antill, 1987; Blank , 1993; Block ,
1983; Hoffman , 1975; Williams & Best, 1990). Therefore it is argued that , by
encouraging aggression and competition, these gender-role expectations serve to reduce
many men ' s or young boys' tendencies to either express or experience guilt.
Disadvantaging others is not only appropriate for males but is often expected of them.
Women ' s roles and social status in Western society are also often associated with
lower social and economic status (Brody & Hall , 1993; Fisher, 1993; Fischer & Janz ,
1995; Harris & Schwab , 1990; Manstead & Fischer , 1996; Stapley & Haviland , 1989).
Many theorists argue that these social factors cause women to rely more heavily on others
for their self-definition , to be more passive , and to experience feelings of helplessness , all
of which are compatible with expectations that women would be more shame-prone than
men. The influence of differential socialization of men and women on shame-related
attributions about the self is made clear by Michael Lewis ( 1992). M. Lewis reviews
evidence suggesting that girls , from an early age onwards , are socialized by parents and
teachers to attribute their failures to internal causes and to attribute their successes to
external causes; the opposite is true for boys . These socialized attributional styles , in
turn, accumulate in the tendency for adult women to report, or young girls to express in
their behavior , responses consistent with feelings of shame. In sum , women and girls are
more likel y to feel shame than men because of their relatively subservient social and
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economic status, in which they are more dependent on others for definitions of selfworth.
According to these arguments, males are also less likely to possess unwanted
identities (the shame-inducing factor) due to the greater power and status afforded them
by society and their socialization. Because males are not socialized to make global
attributions for their failure and are allowed to be autonomous agents pursuing their own
goals, they are less likely to feel shame than females (Ferguson & Eyre , 2000 ; Lewis,
1992).
These theorized gender differences in shame proneness are important because
they may help to explain reports in the psychological literature that twice as many women
are depressed as men (cf. Culbertson , 1997). Many different plausible explanations have
been offered for these findings , yet none of them has adequately explained them (e.g.,
Nolen-Hoeksema , 1987). As mentioned above , shame proneness has been shown to be
predictive of depression whereas guilt proneness has not. Given the relationship of these
emotions to psychological health and the disproportionate number of women suffering
from depression , it is important that psychologists be able to accurately assess and
distinguish between a person ' s guilt and shame proneness.

Empirical Evidence for Gender Differences in
Guilt and Shame

Research concerning gender differences in guilt and shame has produced
contradictory findings. Social scientists have often argued and produced evidence that
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women are more likely to experience and report more guilt and shame than men. For
example, Michael Lewis (1992) found that " ... data from a variety of sources , including
Carol Dweck's work on sex differences in achievement and Aaron Beck's work on
depression, suggest that females are more likely to make global attributions of failure
than males" (p. 73). Similarly , extending Michael Lewis's contention that females are
more shame prone than males, Reimer (1997) stated, "The empirical evidence regarding
gender differences ...suggests quite strongly that across the lifespan females are both more
shame-prone and more guilt-prone than their male counterparts " (p. 46, italics in
original).
Ferguson and Eyre (2000) recently reviewed the empirical evidence regarding
actual gender differences in guilt and shame proneness. They expected to find these
predicted gender differences acros s most studies . What they discovered was that most of
the studies that find gender differences relied on scenario-based assessments of the
emotions . Such instruments include the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory
(SCAAI ; Tangney , 1990) and versions of the TOSCA-2 (Tangney et al., 1996a) . Yet
studies using other methods to assess guilt and shame proneness (e.g ., Brody , 1996, 1997;
Cook , 1996; Ferguson et al., 1999; Harder , 1990, 1995; Harder , Cutler , & Rochart , 1992;
Izard , 1977; Mills , Pederson , & Grusec , 1989; Sorensen et al., 1997) often did not find
the predicted gender differences and sometimes even found that women report guilt and
shame less frequently than men (Harder , 1995).
One of the most widely used scenario-based assessments of gui lt and shame
proneness is the TOSCA-2 (Tangney, Wagner, Gramzow , 1992). The TOSCA-2 presents
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16 hypothetical scenarios that participants imagine have happened to them. In each of
these situations the participant is described as engaging in behaviors that are often
relationally assertive or aggressive and interpersonally hurtful to others. For example,
one situation reads , "You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for
the error." Participants are then asked to rate how likely it is, using a 5-point Likert scale,
they would, among other responses ," ... keep quiet and avoid the co-worker" (this
particular response is an indicator of shame proneness ).
A commonly used measure that does not rely on scenarios is the PFQ-2 (Harder,
Rockart , & Cutler, 1993). In the PFQ-2 , respondents are presented with a list of shameand guilt-related affective descriptors (e.g., for guilt , "regre t" and "remorse ") . which they
then rate in terms of generally how often they experience such feelings. Responses are
given on a scale of (0), for never having experienced the feeling, to (4 ), having
experienced the feeiing continuously or almost continuously.
Why would measures such as the PFQ-2 not reveal the gender differences in guilt
and shame found with the TOSCA-2 ? The PFQ-2 measures the frequency or chronicity
of a person ' s emotional experiences. It, therefore , allows men and women to
differentially call on the types of situations from their personal histories that represent
gender-specific threats. The TOSCA-2 , in contrast , presents scenarios in which the
person usually brings some kind of disadvantage to another. Because the TOSCA-2
involves these kinds of situations, and because disadvantaging others presumably is a
greater unwanted identity for women, women may score higher than men on shame in
response to them . Moreover, the literature on gender roles and stereotypes suggests that
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assertive , aggressive, and competitive interpersonal behaviors that disadvantage others
are seen as more appropriate and acceptable for men than for women , thereby
contributing to women ' s greater guilt proneness. The design of the scenarios in the
TOSCA-2 therefore creates a confound. In order to elicit guilt , the authors introduced
scenarios that cause disadvantage for others , apparently without being aware that in doing
this they were biasing the instrument in favor of finding greater expressions of guilt in
women. Moreover, because causing disadvantage is an especially relevant unwanted
identity for women, the measure additionally inadvertently elicits greater shame in them .
Ferguson et al. (2000) took one of the first steps in testing this hypothesis by
creating scenarios that were intended to be more threatening to the identities of men than
those of women. They administered these new situations as well as situations from the
TOSCA- 2 (Tangney et al., l 996a) to a group of 48 men and 84 women undergraduate
students. The new situations were based on a pilot study in which men and women
generated situation descriptions they perceived as being threatening to men 's identities
(Alberico et al., 1998). The authors demonstrated that most of their new situations (e.g.,
not being able to change a flat tire, crying during an emotional television commercial)
were clearly more threatening to the identities of men than women. In contrast, the
original scenarios in the TOSCA-2 were shown to be more threatening to the identities of
women than men. Importantly , they found the traditional gender difference in shame on
the original TOSCA-2 scenarios (i.e., women scored as more shame prone than men) .
Yet, in the new scenarios, men scored as more shame-prone than women . They were
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able to show that the gender differences in shame were due to gender differences in how
threatening each set of scenarios was to men compared to women.
Ferguson and her colleagues also found gender differences in guilt on both the
new scenarios and the TOSCA-2 scenarios, with men scoring as more guilt prone in the
new situations and women scoring as more guilt prone in the TOSCA-2 situations.
Finding that women scored higher in guilt than men on the original TOSCA-2 scenarios
was expected , because many of the TOSCA-2 situations disadvantage others in some
way. In fact , gender differences in perceptions that they had disadvantaged others is what
accounted for the corresponding gender differences in guilt in these situations . However ,
finding a gender difference in guilt in the new situations was unexpected , because they
had demonstrated that these scenarios brought little disadvantage to others. Impo11antly,
Ferguson and her coauthors report that this gender difference in guilt in response to their
new scenarios was reduced to almost zero when they covaried out guilt's close
association with respondents ' ratings of shame. The authors argued that the gender
difference found for the new "male unwanted identity" situations reflected primarily the
greater threats of the new situations to men ' s identities. The corresponding difference in
guilt appears to be due to the fact that guilt and shame are both negative affects that are
moderately correlated. Intercorrelations of guilt and shame proneness, as measured by
the TOSCA-2 , typically range from .43 to .48 (Tangney, 1990; Tangney et al. , 1993).
In all, Ferguson and her colleagues' line of argument and data supported the
hypothesis that women will manifest stronger shame responses than men only when the
situation at hand is also more threatening to women's identities. One reason that past
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research has shown that women are more shame-prone than men is because it has used
the TOSCA-2, in which the situations represent greater threats to women's than men's
identities.
Despite its contribution, there are limitations to the Ferguson et al. study that this
thesis attempts to redress. One limitation is that they used a small number of new
situations to threaten male identities. A second problem is that they relied exclusively on
the original TOSCA-2 scenarios to represent situations that would threaten female
identities. The problem in relying on the TOSCA-2 to threaten female identities is that
most of the TOSCA-2 situations also bring disadvantage to another. Thus, we do not
know whether the tendency for women to more strongly endorse shame than men occurs
only when another has been disadvantaged, and is thereby confounded by the guilteliciting condition , or whether this gender difference in shame would also result in
situations involving no disadvantage whatsoever. This last limitation raises an interesting
question: are there situations involving greater unwanted identities for women that do not
involve hurting another?
Based on research findings obtained outside of the area of self-conscious emotion ,
specifically, Eisler and his colleagues ' work concerning stress and gender , it is proposed
that this question can be answered in the affirmative. Eisler and Skidmore ( 1987) and
Gillespie and Eisler ( 1992) have demonstrated there are situations that are differentially
"stressful" to men and women. Although the concept of stress is a broad one , some of
the situations they identified seem to be differentially stressful precisely because they
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represent gender-specific unwanted identities that are very similar to those thought to
elicit shame in women and men .
Using the Feminine Gender Role Stress (FORS) and the Masculine Gender Role
Stress (MGRS) scales, Eisler and his colleagues identified five homogeneous categories
of female gender role stressors and five homogeneous categories of male gender role
stressors. Table 1 outlines the female gender role versus male gender role stressors that
were empirically validated in Eisler and his colleagues' research.
For example, items on the MGRS loading on the fear of physical inadequacy
factor include: being perceived as "gay," being perceived as having feminine traits, and
losing in a sports competition.

Items loading on the FORS under the fear of physical

Table I

Eisler and Colleagues ' Gender Role Stressors
Male stressors

3

Female stressorst,

1) Fear of physical inadequac y

1) Fear of unemotional relationships

2) Fear of emotional expressiveness

2) Fear of being unattractive

3) Fear of subordination to women

3) Fear of victimization

4) Fear of intellectual inferiority

4) Fear of behaving assertively

5) Fear of work/sex performance failure

5) Fear of not being nurturant

3

Eis ler & Skidmore, 1987. 6Gillespie & Eisler, 1992.
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unattractiveness factor include: being perceived by others as overweight, being heavier
than your mate , and being unusually tall.
Therefore, scenarios used in the MGRS and FGRS scales provide an empirical
basis for the development of scenarios that are uniquely threatening to the identities of
men and women. Situations representing these scales were developed for the present
research and pilot tested to ensure that respondents did, in fact , find they were
differentially threatening to the identities of men and women. Moreover, these unwanted
identities can be developed into two types of scenarios: one set that "brings
disadvantage" and another set that "does not bring disadvantage ." This allows the
unwanted identity factor (the shame-eliciting condition) to be unconfounded from the
disadvantage factor (the primary guilt-eliciting condition). When all of these scenarios
are combined into one instrument, it represents a new measure , entitled the Gender
Relevant TOSCA (GR-TOSCA).
Based on the literature reviewed here , several predictions can be made about the
relative guilt- and shame-proneness of men and women as measured by the new
situations presented in the GR-TOSCA. Specifically, shame proneness is predicted to be:
(a) greater for women than men when others are disadvantaged , (b) greater for women
when a female-relevant identity (not involving disadvantaging others) is threatened, (c)
greater for men than women when a male-relevant identity is threatened, and (d) equal in
men and women when comparisons are made between situations that neither uniquely
threaten a man's nor a woman's identity. In terms of gender differences in guilt, women
should score higher than men only when the situations involve disadvantage to another.
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CHAPTER III
PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

Ferguson and her associates' study demonstrates the need to separate the eliciting
conditions of guilt from those of shame in a gender-sensitive manner. Their research
clearly showed that the typically found gender differences in shame can be reversed if the
biased nature of the stimulus situations used in the instrument is reversed as well. The
proposed research will expand upon this line of inquiry, partially by attempting to
replicate these findings, but also by employing a methodology that will further separate
and independently analyze the heretofore confounded variables of "disadvanta ging
others" versus "identity threats ." Additionally, the assertion that conformity to
stereotypical gender roles is the basis for the gender differences in guilt- and sha meproneness observed on the TOSCA-2 and in the new scenarios developed for this thesis
wi ll be tested. The specific objectives of this research are therefore:
1. To construct and investigate evidence for the psychometric integrity of the GRTOSCA, a scenario-based measure of guilt- and shame-proneness developed in this
thesis. Along the lines suggested by the research of Alberico et al. (1998), it is proposed
that these new scenarios should represent situations that: (a) threaten men 's versus
women's identities while also additionally bringing disadvantage to others; (b) threaten
men's versus women's identities while not bringing disadvantage to others; (c) bring
disadvantage to others, but threaten neither men 's nor women's identities (beyond the
disadvantage-brought feature of the situation); or (d) threaten neither men's nor women's
identities while not bringing disadvantage to others. The psychometric integrity of this

21

new instrument will be assessed by providing evidence for the validity and reliability of
the instrument. Validity will be assessed by correlating GR-TOSCA shame and guilt
scores with similar scales from the TOSCA-2. Reliability of the GR-TOSCA will be
assessed by determining the internal consistency of appropriate items and by examining
test-retest correlations based upon a 3-week test-retest interval.
2. To determine the extent to which scores on the GR-TOSCA are higher for shame
proneness when the scenarios presented uniquely threaten the participants ' gender
identities (versus when they do not), thereby replicating and expanding upon Ferguson
and her colleagues ' research. A corollary of this objective is that these gender
differences in shame should be accounted for by gender differences in ratings of
unwanted identity.
3. To determine the extent to which women score higher in guilt on the GR-TOSCA
scenarios that bring disadvantage than scenarios that do not bring disadvantage . A
corollary of this objective is that these gender differences in guilt should be accounted for
by gender differences in the extent to which they perceive the situations as
disadvantaging others.
4. To determine the extent to which women and men ' s guilt and shame proneness scores
are similar on those GR-TOSCA scenarios that are not uniquely threatening to men
versus women ' s identities nor bring disadvantage to others.
5. To determine the relationship of participants' endorsement of stereotypical gender
personality characteristics to guilt- and shame-proneness on the TOSCA-2 and the GRTOSCA , thereby testing the assertion that the gender roles to which individuals subscribe
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play a major role in impacting these scores. Individual differences in the extent to which
traditional U.S. gender roles of masculinity versus femininity are endorsed (as measured
by the Bern Sex Role Inventory [BSRI ; Bern, 1974]) should account for differences found
in shame- and guilt-proneness . Individuals who endorse traditional feminine roles should
report greater shame and guilt proneness. In contrast , those endorsing traditional
masculine roles should endorse less guilt or shame proneness.
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CHAPTER IV
METHOD

Participants

Two-hundred and five participants (93 men and 109 women) were recruited from
an undergraduate introductory psychology course at Utah State University (USU).
Students enrolled in an introductory psychology course are representative of the
demographics of students attending the university at large , because this class can be used
to fulfill a breadth course designation of USU's University Studies requirement.
According to USU's statistics, the average age of undergraduate students in the College
of Education during 2000-2001 was 23.7 years (USU Fact Book , 2001). Ninety percent
of these students were Caucasian.
In exchange for their participation , participants were given extra credit points
towards their course grade. Although it is plausible that the phenomena under
investigation operate similarly in a broader population , generalizations of findings will be
constrained to the population from which the sample is drawn.

Procedure

Participants were each provided with packets containing brief instructions , an
informed consent form , and " bubble sheet" answer forms for the BSRI, TOSCA-2 and
the GR-TOSCA (see Appendices A, B, C, and D). The instructions directed participants
to a Hypertext Markup Language page (HTML) on the World Wide Web (WWW) that
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provided the questions for each of the instruments.

Participants read the questions on the

HTML page and recorded their answers on their answer forms. For the GR-TOSCA, the
order of both the scenarios and their corresponding questions were counterbalanced

in

three separate versions to help control for item order effects. Participants recorded their
responses to the instruments by filling in bubbles that were later scanned and entered into
a database with a scanner connected to a computer.
Completely separate from the procedure mentioned above, 25 (21 female, 4 male)
undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at USU completed
the GR-TOSCA twice , 3 weeks apart. For this administration, the GR-TOSCA was
converted into HTML and administered via the World Wide Web on the Internet. This
Internet version of the GR-TOSCA was the same as the pencil-and-paper version, except
that students marked their answers by clicking in "radio-buttons"
response-bubbles

instead of filling in

with a pencil. Responses were automatically retrieved and entered into

a database for analysis.

Description of Instruments and Their Scale Scores

The Test of Self-Conscious Affect-2
The TOSCA-2 consists of 16 hypothetical scenarios representing transgressions
and failures in family and work situations, such as: spilling red punch on a coworker 's
new cream-colored carpet (and hiding the mistake) , breaking a lunch date , and making a
mistake at work when people were depending on you (see Appendix D). On the TOSCA2, participants rated how likely they would be to react in several ways to each situation.
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Scores for guilt proneness were created by averaging scores on guilt keyed responses
(min= 1, max = 5); scores for shame proneness were created by averaging scores on
shame-keyed responses (min = 1, max = 5).
Scores for guilt and shame proneness in the TOSCA-2 have been shown to be
internally consistent (Cronbach 's alpha= .81 and . 78) by Ferguson and colleagues
(2000). These results are similar to those reported by Tangney , Wagner , Hill-Barlow ,
Marschall , and Gramzow (l 996b) for the original TOSCA (Cronbach's alpha = .61 and
.74 for guilt and shame proneness scores, respectively).

Similar coefficient alphas were

computed based on the current research data , resulting in alphas of .79 and .80 for guilt
and shame proneness , respectively . Although published data explicitly examining the
construct validity of the TOSCA-2 are unavailable , in-house data sets of Ferguson 's show
that scores from the TOSCA-2 subscale s correlate very highly with the original TOSCA
and the SCAAJ subscales (see also Tangney , 1996), the latter of which has been validated
(Tangney , 1990) .

The Gender Relevant Test of Self-Conscious Affect.
The GR-TOSCA was developed for this thesis and is based on the TOSCA-2 and
the research of Eisler and Skidmore (1987) and Gillespie and Eisler (1992 ; see Appendix
B). The GR -TOSCA consists of22 scenarios presented in a similar format as items on
the TOSCA-2. The feminine gender role stress and masculine gender role stress factors
that Eisler and colleagues identified (listed in Table I) were used to identify the types of
scenarios that could be constructed to uniquely threaten women's and men's identities.
In addition, the GR-TOSCA included scenarios that are not differentially threatening to
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men or women. These three categories of scenarios (male threatening, female
threatening , not differentially gender threatening) were further subdivided into those that
brought disadvantage and those that did not bring disadvantage. The resulting instrument
therefore consists of six types of scenarios, written by this author. A group of initial
scenarios meeting these criteria were piloted prior to the current research by presenting
them to psychology undergraduate students and asking to what degree they represented
an unwanted identity for men and women. 2 Scenarios that were not rated by these
participants as expected were eliminated.
An example of each of these scenario types is presented in Table 2. The factors
from Eisler and his colleagues ' research (see Table 1) from which the gender-threatening
scenarios were derived are noted in parentheses. Each type of scenario is labeled in
Table 2 according to the particular threat that it represents. For example , scenarios that
represent a male unwanted identity and bring disadvantage are labeled MUI , BD ; this
labeling will hereafter be used to refer to these scenario types.
Because some of the language used in the GR-TOSCA is gender specific , male
and female versions were created by making slight language changes as necessary.

For

example , men were presented with a scenario that read , "At the same time your wife
becomes a partner at a prestigious law firm , you are laid off your job and must stay home
to watch the kids and take care of housekeeping. " In the female version of this scenario

2

During pilot testing, participants from the same population were presented with potential GR-TOSCA
scenarios and asked to what degree they thought these scenarios represented gender-relevant threats.
Scenarios that were not found by these participants to be differentially gender threatening were eliminated
from further consideration .
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Table 2

Examples of Scenario Types in the GR-TOSCA
Situation Type

Example Scenario from GR-TOSCA

Male unwanted identity ,
doesn ' t bring disadvantage
(MUI/DBD)

" You ask a woman you know out on a
date. She looks surprised , but accepts
your invitation. When you ask about the
surprised look , she responds , "Well , to
be honest , I always thought you were
homosexual. I guess it's because of the
way you act sometimes." (Eisler's fear
of physical inadequacy factor)

Male unwanted identity ,
brings disadvantage
(MUI/BD)

"After a romantic evening , your spouse
initiates sex . But for some reason , you
are unable to respond sexually ." (Eisler's
fear of work/sex performance failure
factor)

Not differentially gender threatening ,
doesn ' t bring disadvantage
(NUI/DBD)

Even though you studied very hard , you
failed a big test in one of your classes.

Not differentially gender threatening ,
brings disadvantage
(NUI/BD)

"You ' re borrowing your friend ' s
computer when an error message
suddenly appears on the screen. Even
though you don ' t know that much about
computers , you try to fix the problem.
Because of your inability to operate the
computer , you erase all the files on the
computer including your friend ' s 15
page assignment that is due the next
day. "

(table continues)
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Fema le identity threatening,
doesn't bring disadvantage
(FUI/BDB)

"Your best friend suddenly won't return
you ca lls and seems to be avoiding you."
(Eisler's fear of not being nurturant
factor)

Female identity threatening,
brings disadvantage
(FUI , BD)

"You promised your family to do some
modeling, like you used to do in high
school , to earn extra money to support
your college education. Agencies won ' t
hire you though , since you don ' t look the
same anymore." (Eisler's fear of
physical unattractiveness factor)

the word "wife " was replace with "husband. " Similar changes were made to several of
the scenarios to create a version of the instrument appropriate for use with males or with
females.
One of the primary purposes of this research was to investigate the psychometric
properties of the GR-TOSCA. Therefore , reliability analyses for each of the subscales of
the GR-TOSCA will be reported in the Results chapter.
After reading each of the 22 GR-TOSCA scenarios, respondents rated the extent
3

to which they would react in several different ways on 7-point scales (min = 1, max = 7).
Two of the reactions to each scenario were intended to be indicators of shame proneness
and two were meant to represent guilt proneness. Specifically , shame was
operationalized in each scenario as participants' ratings of (a) a shame cognition (e.g.,
"How much would you feel like a failure as a man/woman? "), and (b) a shame action

3

Although the GR-TOSCA is modeled after the TOSCA-2, which uses 5-point sca les, 7-point scales were
chosen for the GR-TOSCA to reduce the possibility of "tloor " or "cei ling" effects in responses.
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tendency ( e.g., "How likely would you be to lower your head and avoid eye contact?").
Guilt was similarly operationalized as participants' ratings of (a) a guilt cognition (e.g.,
"How much would you worry that your significant other is embarrassed by your weight
gain?), and (b) a guilt action tendency (e.g., " How much would you want to apologize to
your friend?) . The correlations between the cognition and action components of the guilt
and shame scales was substantial (for guilt r = .87,p < .001, for shame r = .82,p < .001).
Therefore guilt and shame proneness scores were computed by adding these two
components together.
In addition to offering these ratings, participants were asked " In this situation, to
what extent do you come across as possessing undesirable characteristics?," which was
included as a check on the extent to which each situation represented an unwanted
identity for participants.

The exte nt to which participants perceiv ed themselves as

disadvantaging others in the situation was assessed by having respondents rate "To what
extent do you feel you caused trouble for others involved in the situation?" For each of
the six types of scenarios, scores could thus be derived for shame proneness (average of
two ratings) , guilt proneness (average of two ratings), perception of unwanted identities ,
and perception having disadvantaged others.

Bern Sex Role Inventory

Masculinity and femininity scores on the BSRI , short form (Bern, 1974; see
Appendix C) were used to test the assertio n that possession of stereotypical gender
personality characteristics plays a major role in determini ng scores on the TOSCA and
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the GR-TOSCA.

The short form version of this instrument was used to help minimize

the time required for participants to complete all of the instruments presented to them .
The BSRI short form (Bern, 1974 ; Lenny , 1991) consists of30 items describing
personality characteristics that are stereotypically masculine (e.g., assertive , strong
personality) , feminine (e.g., affectionate, sympathetic), or filler (e.g. conscientious ,
moody). Participants rated each item in terms of how well it described them on a scale
from "Neve r or almost never true " to "A lway s or almost always true". Scores were
derived (min = 1, max = 7) for masculinity and for femininity by averaging participants'
ratings on the 10 masculinity items and 10 femininity items. Lenny (199 1), who has
summarized psychometric assessments of the BSRI , noted that , not only is it one of the
most frequently used instruments to assess espo used sex roles , but it is also among the
most frequently used psychological tests reviewed in The Mental Measurements

Yearbook (M itchell & Burns , 1998) . Numerous studies investigating the BSRI have
produced substantial evidence for its reliability (Bern , 1974 ; Rowland , 1977 ; Wilson &
Cook, 1984; Yanico, 1985) and validity (Bern & Lewis , 1975 ; Liberman & Gaa, 1986 ;
Orlofsky & Windle, 1978 ; Ramanaiah & Martin , 1984 ; Taylor, 1984; Taylor & Hall ,
1982 ; Wiggins & Holzmuller , 1981) . Bern (1974) also reported high internal consistency
of the BSRI ; coefficient alpha was .86 for masculinity and .90 for femininity . Similar
alphas were found for these sca les in the current research, which were .79 for masculinity
and .92 for femininity.
(n

The masculinity and femininity scores were correlated at .43

= 106, p < .001) for women, and .37

(n

= 89,p = .001) for men in this samp le.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS

This chapter is organized into five sections, corresponding to the five objectives
stated in the Purposes and Objectives chapter. These objectives were to: (a) examine the
psychometric integrity of the GR-TOSCA; (b) examine whether shame scores were,
indeed , higher when the gender relevant identity was threatened and whether this
difference, if found, could be accounted for by gender differences in unwanted identity
perceptions; (c) examine whether women scored higher in guilt than men when their
behavior was perceived to disadvantage another and whether this difference , if found ,
could be accounted for by gender differences in perceptions of disadvantaging others; (d)
exami ne whether gender differences in shame or guilt scores were small in size in
situations not representing a gender-relevant threat or not bringing disadvantage to
others ; and (e) examine the extent to which guilt or shame scores were substantially
correlated with an accepted measure of sex role endorsement. Analyses and results
bearing on each of these five objectives are detailed in the present chapter.
The null hypotheses in this chapter were statistically tested using a .05 level of
significance. This level of significance was selected based on the decision that a
probability greater than 5% that the findings arose as a result of sampling error , if the null
hypothesis is true , is unacceptable. Effect size estimates were also calculated to aid in the
testing of hypotheses . These estimates were calculated by using Cohen's d, dividing the
difference between the two scores being compared by the average of their standard
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deviations (Cohen, 1988). 112 effect sizes were also used where appropriate . Because of
the exploratory nature of this research, these estimates of the "degree to which the null
hypothesis is false" (Cohen , 1988, p. 9-10) , were interpreted liberally , with values of .20
or greater considered significant. The complex nature of the constructs examined in this
exploratory research and the difficulties inherent in measuring them warrant the
consideration of estimates of effect size traditionally defined as "small" (Stevens, 1999).
Finally, because cell sizes varied somewhat as a result of the number of participants
completing items on the instruments , cell sizes are reported with each statistical test.

Objective 1: Manipulation Checks , Validity ,
and Reliability of the GR-TOSCA

The first purpose of the thesis was to examine the effectiveness of the
manipulations present in the GR-TOSCA and to examine evidence pertaining to the
validity and reliability of the guilt and shame proneness scores derived from that
instrument. Evidence bearing on this objective is presented below.

Manipulation of Unwanted Identitie s and
Disadvantaging Others
Each of the 22 scenarios included in the GR-TOSCA was meant to represent one
of six cells: MUI/DBD, FUI/DBD, NUI/DBD , MUI/BD, FUI/BD, NUI/BD (see Table 2).

It is, of course, imperative to examine the effectiveness of these manipulations and to
exclude scenarios from further analyses that did not adequately convey the intended

4

2

l) effect sizes that do not come close to approaching the minimum levels of significant are not reported.
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manipulations.

After considering various alternative criteria, a relatively simple criterion

was adopted to decide whether a scenario did or did not adequately convey to participants
that disadvantage had (or had not) been brought to another. Specifically , for each
scenario, participants ' average rating of the degree to which others were disadvantaged in
that scenario was calculated using the ratings of all participants. Scenarios with an
average rating above four (the midpoint of the rating scale) were determined to bring
disadvantage , whereas those with an average rating below four were determined to not
bring disadvantage . For example , in one situation that was determined to bring
disadvantage to others , participants were asked to imagine , "You were fired from your
job two months ago for constantly being late. You ' re still not working and now you ' re
unable to support your family. Your friends and family keep asking you , ' Are you ever
going to get another job?' " In this case , the disadvantage being brought is the target not
being able to support the family . In a scenario that was determined to not bring
disadvantage to others , participants were asked to imagine , "You haven't been shopping
in awhile. During a big sale , you grab a bunch of clothes of your normal size to go try
on. You get to the dressing room and all of them are too small. " This scenario was
deemed to not bring disadvantage in the sense of harming someone. To avoid confusion
on the reader's part , it should be stressed that the first example also represents a male
unwanted identity and the second example also represents a female unwanted identity.
The criteria for deciding that a scenario was more threatening to one gender ' s
identity than the other were more complex, as this selection process necessitated
comparing participants' average rating of the degree to which each scenario represented

34
unwanted identities for men versus women. The gender relevancy of the unwanted
identities represented in each scenario was examined by calculating paired /-tests
between the scores of the extent to which a scenario was seen to be threatening to the
"typical male" versus the "typical female" and by examining the effect sizes of these
differences.

Effect sizes of .20 and p values of less than .05 were used as cut-off values

to determine which scenarios represented male- or female-relevant identity threats.
Scenarios that failed to meet these standards were determined to not be differentially
gender threatening.

For example, a scenario that met the criteria for being a male- versus

a female-relevant identity threat was: " You ask a woman/man you know out on a date .
She/he looks surprised, but accepts your invitation. When you ask about the surprised
look , she/he responds, ' Well , to be honest , I always thought you were homosexual.
guess it's because of the way you act sometimes'."

I

This scenario represented a "male

unwanted identity" threat , according to the criteria outlined above.

In a scenario that met

the criteria for being a female- versus a male-relevant identity threat , participants were
asked to imagine , "Your doctor has just informed you that you are permanently sterile. "
This scenario represented a "female-unwanted identity " threat , according to the criteria
outlined above.
Using these guidelines , 17 of the original 22 scenarios represented in the GRTOSCA met the selection criteria for defining the six types of scenarios that this
instrument was meant to encompass. Only the 17 scenarios that fulfilled criteria are used
in subsequent analyses. The breakdown of the 17 scenarios across the six cells is
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Table 3

Number of GR-TOSCA Scenarios Representing Each Scenario Type
Brings
disadvantage
(BO)

Does not bring
disadvantage
(DBD)

Male Unwanted Identity (MUI)

2

2

Female Unwanted Identity (FUI)

3

3

Gender Neutral Unwanted Identity (NUI)

5

2

presented in Table 3. This table shows that each cell will be represented by anywhere
from two to five scenarios .
As a verification that this selection procedure worked as expected , two
multivariate analyses of variance (MANOV As) were conducted on the scores for
perceptions of unwanted identity and disadvantaging others from the GR-TOSCA.

The se

were 2 x 3 x 2 mixed-design MANOVAs , representing the factorial combination of
Participant Gender (males versus female) x Gender Rele vant Threat (male unwanted
identity versus female unwanted identity versus gender-neutral unwanted identity) x
Disadvantage (brought disadvantage versus did not bring disadvantage) , treating the latter
two as within subjects factors. These two MANOV As served as omnibus tests of the
effectiveness of the two manipulations built into the GR-TOSCA.
The dependent variable for the first MANOVA (n = 191) was the difference
between participants ' rating of the extent to which the identity at issue in the scenarios
would be threatening to a "typical male " versus a "typical female." Therefore , a positive
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difference score means that participants perceived the target scenario to be more
threatening to males , and a negative difference score means that participants rated the
identity as more threatening to females. A main effect for gender relevant threat was
2

found, F(2, 188) = 84.15,p < .001, 11 = .47. In addition , there was a statistically
significant Gender Relevant Threat x Disadvantage interaction , F (2, 188) = 151.09 ,
2

p < .001, 11 = .62. Figure I displays the average difference scores (ratings of male

unwanted identity -- ratings of female unwanted identity) for the stories representing each
of the three unwanted identity cells , partitioned by whether disadvantage had or had not
been brought.
Figure 1 shows that, for both the BD and DBD levels of disadvantage , the
scenarios in the male unwanted identity condition (MUI) were perceived to elicit greater
unwanted identities in "typical" men than women ; those in the female unwanted identity
condition (FUI) were perceived to elicit greater unwanted identities in "typical " women
than men; those in the neutral condition (NUT) were not perceived to elicit differentially
greater unwanted identities in either gender. Given the statistically significant Gender
Relevant Threat x Disadvantage interaction , it was also important to ask whether the
predicted differences in unwanted identity perceptions were found at each level of the
disadvantage variable. This question can be addressed in multiple ways. For the thesis, a
follow-up MANOV A was conducted on the unwanted identity difference scores at each
level of the disadvantage variable, treating gender relevant threat as the only withinsubjects effect. This was done to determine whether there was a statistically
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Figure 1. Average ratings of male unwanted identity minus female unwanted identity for
all scenario types on the GR-TOSCA.
Note. MUI = Male Unwanted Identity , FUI = Female Unwanted Identity
significant quadratic component to these difference scores as a function of unwanted
identity condition , that is, to ascertain whether the difference scores formed a "V" shape ,
with the scores for the MUI being positive, those for the FUI being negative , and those
for the NUI being closer to zero . As would be expected , a significant quadratic effect of
gender relevant threat was found when this analysis was conducted in the brought
disadvantage cells only , F= (1, 200) = 241.53,p < .001 , 1i2= .49, and when the analysis
was conducted in the did not bring disadvantage cells only, F = (1,200) = 223.60, p <
.001, 1i2= .47. In short, the expected pattern was obtained in both types of disadvantage
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cells (as seen in Figure 1), but the effect was somewhat, though negligibly , stronger when
disadvantage had been brought.
To ascertain whether participants perceived the scenarios to differ in the extent to
which someone had been disadvantaged, a mixed design 2 x 3 x 2 MANOV A (Gender x
Gender Relevant Threat x Disadvantage) was conducted on the average scores for ratings
of how much the scenarios "caused trouble " for others (n

=

192). Statistically significant

effects were found for the disadvantage variable, F (1, 190) = 489 .29 , p < .001 , ri2 = .54,
the gender relevant threat variable, F (2, 189) = 55.82 , p < .001 ,

1/= .75, and the

Disadvantage x Gender Relevant Threat interaction , F (2, 189) = 88.54 , p < .001 ,
2

11 = .34. The main effect for disadvantage revealed that participants perceived that more
trouble was caused for others when disadvantage had been brought (M = 4 .85, SD = 1.02)
than when disadvantage had not been brought (M = 3 .21, SD = 1.3), indicating a
successful manipulation . The main effect for gender relevant threat indicated that
participants perceived more trouble

to

have been caused for others in the MUI scenarios

(M = 4.36 , SD = 1.21) than in either the FUJ (M = 3.79 , SD= 1.17) or NUI scenarios
(M = 3.94 , SD = 1.12). However , as seen in Figure 2, the Gender Relevant Threat x
Disadvantage interaction actually indicates the largest difference in the NUI condition ,
that is, when comparing ratings of perceived trouble in the "brought disadvantage " to
"did not bring disadvantage" cells , this difference was largest in the NUI cells. All in all,
the disadvantage manipulation was successful at each level of gender relevant threat
(MUI, FUI , and NUI) , but was strongest in the gender neutral condition.
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Figure 2. Average ratings of perception of bringing disadvantage for all scenario types
on the GR-TOSCA.
Note. MUI = Male Unwanted Identity , FUI = Fema le Unwan ted Identity.

These manipulations were successfu l, although it is also obvious that it was
difficult to independently manipulate the supposed shame inducing factor (unwanted
identity vis

avis

gen der relevant threat) and the purported gui lt indu cing factor (bri nging

disadva ntage).

Internal Consistency Reliability of the GR-TOSCA
To examine the reli abilit y of the GR-TOSCA sham e and guilt proneness scores,
as well as the ratings of unwanted identity and disad vantaging others , Cronbach's alpha
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Table 4
Internal Consistency of GR-TOSCA Subscales.
GR-TOSCA Subscale

Alpha

n

Disadvantaging others

.85

202

Unwanted identity

.90

204

Shame

.91

194

Guilt

.90

200

(as a measure of internal consistency) was calculated for these scores for each of the six
types of scenarios that met criteria. Table 4 shows that the alphas for these shame and
guilt proneness scores were good by most standards (e.g., Nunnally , 1967, 1978;
Thorndike & Hagen , 1977), ranging from .85 to .91.

Test-retest reliabilit y of the Gender Relevant
Test of Self-Conscious Affect
To ascertain the test-retest reliability of the GR-TOSCA scale scores , 25 (21
female , 4 male) undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at
Utah State University completed the GR-TOSCA twice , three weeks apa11. The low
number of males in this sample was apparently due to an overall low volunteer rate and
the disproportionate number of women enrolled in the course at that time. Pearson
product-moment correlations were calculated between the ratings that were provided at
the two testing periods. As seen in Table 5, the test-retest correlation coefficients were
remarkably high, ranging from .78 to .83. All coefficients were statistically significant
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Table 5

Test-Retest Reliability of the GR-TOSCA Subscales
r

n

Shame

.81

25

Guilt

.83

25

Disadvantaging others

.78

25

Unwanted identities

.83

25

Subscale

(p < .001). All in all , the internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the GRTOSCA subscales are very acceptable by current psychometric standards.

Concurrent Validity of the GR-TOSCA
To provide evidence for the concurrent validity of the GR-TOSCA scenarios , it
was necessary to demonstrate that the shame proneness scores (and guilt proneness
scores) from this instrument were substantially related to comparable scores from an
already accepted instrument , the TOSCA-2. To examine this evidence for concurrent
validity , the zero-order bivariate correlation coefficients were computed between scale
scores on the GR-TOSCA and comparable scales from the TOSCA-2.

In addition to

these zero-order calculations , first -order (also known as "part") correlation coefficients
were computed, in which the variance shared with shame was residualized from guilt and
vice versa in each instrument. The use of part correlations is standard practice in this
literature, because researchers often find that guilt proneness is moderately correlated
with shame proneness (Tangney, Burggraf & Wagner, 1995; Tangney et al., 1996b;
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Tangney , Wagner , Fletcher & Gramzow, 1992; Tangney, 1995b). In the present sample ,
there was actually a considerable amount of variance shared in common between the guilt
proneness and shame proneness scores. The zero-order Pearson product moment
correlations between guilt and shame proneness scores in this sample (calculated across
the 17 scenarios that met the selection criteria) were substantial , with the r being .60 for
the TOSCA-2, (df = 201,p <.001) and with the r being .83 for the GR-TOSCA (df= 190,
p < .001 ). Clearly, there is considerable overlap in participants ' ratings of these two

emotions , at least as operationalized in these instruments.
To gain an overall picture of the evidence for the concurrent validity of the GRTOSCA, zero-order and part correlation coefficients were computed for various scores
across the TOSCA-2 and GR-TOSCA instruments . Specifically, the zero-order
correlation coefficients represent the Pearson product moment corr elations between
scores on one instrument (e.g. , TOSCA-2 guilt) and those on the other instrument (e.g. ,
GR-TOSCA guilt). The part correlation coefficients computed are the Pearson product
moment correlation between (a) scores on one instrument (e.g., TOSCA-2 guilt) once
residualized for its emotion counterpart on the same instrument (e.g. , TOSCA-2 shame)
with (b) the scores on the other instrument (e.g., GR-TOSCA guilt) once residualized for
its emotion counterpart (e.g., GR-TOSCA shame). The results of these analyses are
reported in Table 6.
To provide further evidence for the validity of the GR-TOSCA , it was also
important to determine if these correlations were statistically significantly different from
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Table 6

Relation of GR-TOSCA and TOSCA-2 Guilt and Shame Proneness Scores
GR-TOSCA
Zero-order
TOSCA-2

Shame

Part
Guilt

Shame

.78a 1**

. 6"
., b I**

Guilt

.51/**

.65c **

1

Guilt

Shame
1

. "4
., b I**

.6la **
-.41/**

.51/**

Note. Within each group , correlations in a row that do not share identical subscripts, or
those within a column that do not share identical superscripts, differ significantly at
p < .05. The cell sizes for these analyses ranged from 186 to 202.
** p < .001.

each other , where appropriate . For example , although the part correlation between GRTOSCA shame and TOSCA-2 shame should be positive and statistically significant , the
part correlation between GR-TOSCA shame and TOSCA-2 guilt should be statistically
significantly lower and /or negative. Hotelling ' s I tests were , therefore , conducted to test
for the equality of these dependent correlation coefficients , where appropriate.

The

results of these analyses are also reported in Table 6.
The question being addressed in Table 6 is whether across instruments
correlations between what is supposedly the "same " construct (e.g. , TOSCA-2 shame
correlated with GR-TOSCA shame) are higher than across instrument correlations of
what is supposedly a "different " construct ( e.g. , TOSCA-2 shame correlated with GRTOSCA guilt). If one examines the zero-order (and part) correlation coefficients in Table
6, it is seen that TOSCA-2 shame and GR-TOSCA shame scores are more highly
correlated than are TOSCA-2 guilt and GR-TOSCA shame scores and than are TOSCA-2
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shame and GR-TOSCA guilt scores. This provides evidence for the concurrent validity
of the shame scores. Concurrent validity of the guilt scores is also apparent , especially in
the part correlation results. Specifically , the zero-order correlation coefficient between
TOSCA-2 guilt and GR-TOSCA guilt is greater than that between TOSCA-2 guilt and
GR-TOSCA shame , but it is not greater than the zero-order correlation between TOSCA2 shame and GR-TOSCA guilt. Nonetheless , the part correlations show that TOSCA-2
and GR-TOSCA guilt are much more positively associated than either of the crosscorrelations. The general conclusion , therefore , is that there is good concurrent validity
evidence for the guilt and shame scales from the GR-TOSCA , especially after the strong
common variance shared by guilt and shame , either due to method similarity or construct
overlap, is accounted for. It should also be noted that there is considerable evidence from
the part compared to zero order correlation coefficients that suppressor effects are
operating , revealing a need to conduct the additional anal yses for this thes is on the
residualized scores .
The correlational analyses outlined above were then conducted for subsets of the
GR-TOSCA scenarios to examine specific predictions bearing on gender differences in
the magnitude of the correlations as a function of whether the situations were gender
threatening or brought disadvantage to another . Tables 7 through 9 provide detailed
information regarding these correlations as well as statistical tests (Hotelling ' s t) of the
equality ofrelevant dependent correlations. To briefly summarize the wealth of findings
depicted in these tables , the reader will note that all of the predictions were borne out ,
with the exception of those made for the MUI/BD cell and the NUI /DBD cell.
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Table 7

Relation Between Women 's Guilt and Shame Proneness Scores on the TOSCA-2 and GRTOSCA (NUIIBD and FUIIBD Scenarios)
GR-TOSCA NUI/BD Scenarios, n = 101
TOSCA-2
shame
residual

Shame residual

Guilt residual

.57a**

guilt
residual

GR-TOSCA FUI/BD Scenarios, n = 104
TOSCA-2

Shame residual

shame
residual

.62a**

guilt
residual

-.30a**

Guilt residual

Note. Correlations within a row that do not share identical subscripts differ significantly
atp < .05 .
*p < .05. **p <.01.

It was predicted that women's guilt and shame proneness scores on the TOSCA-2
would positively correlate with GR-TOSCA guilt and shame proneness scores on
scenarios that (a) bring disadvantage and are not differentially gender threatening
(scenarios in the NUI/BD cell) , and (b) bring disadvantage and are uniquely threatening
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to women's identities (scenarios in the FUI/BD cell). Table 7 shows that the part
correlations between women's corresponding emotion scores (i.e., TOSCA-2 and GRTOSCA guilt or TOSCA-2 and GR-TOSCA shame) are high and differ statistically
significantly from women ' s "opposing " emotion scores (i.e., TOSCA-2 guilt with GRTOSCA shame or TOSCA-2 shame with GR-TOSCA guilt).

Table 8
Relation Between Women's Guilt and Shame Proneness Scores on the TOSCA-2 and GRTOSCA (NUIIDBD and A1UJIDBD Scenarios)

GR-TOSCA NUI/DBD Scenarios, n = 102
TOSCA-2

shame
residual
guilt
residual

Shame residual

Guilt residual

.33a**

.14a

-.09a

.09a

GR-TOSCA MUI/DBD Scenarios, n = 103
TOSCA -2

Shame residual

Guilt residual

shame
residual
guilt
residual

-.19a

Note. Correlations within a row that do not share identical subscripts differ significantly
at p < .05. *p < .05. **p <.01.
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Women's guilt and shame proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 were also correlated
with GR-TOSCA guilt and shame proneness scores on scenarios that (a) do not bring
disadvantage and are not differentially gender threatening (NUI/DBD), and (b) do not
bring disadvantage and are uniquely threatening to men's identities (MUI/DBD). These
correlations are shown in Table 8. Because disadvantaging others represents an
additional unwanted identity for women, the correlations between women's guilt and
shame proneness scores on the GR-TOSCA and the TOSCA-2 were predicted to be
higher for those situations that bring disadvantage. The correlations for scenarios
NUI/DBD and NUI/DB in Tables 8 and 9, indeed , show that this is the case . Hotelling ' s
t demonstrated that the correlations for both shame , t (98) = 2. 73, p < .001 , and guilt ,

t (102) = 4.62 , p < .00 I , were statistically significantly different.
It was also predict ed that the correlations between women ' s guilt and shame
proneness scores on the GR-TOSCA and the TOSCA-2 would be higher for those
scenarios that represent a female unwanted identity and bring disadvantage (FUI/BD)
than those scenarios that represent a male unwanted identity and do not bring
disadvantage (MUI/DBD). Again , the correlations presented in Tables 8 and 9 show this
to be the case. Hotelling ' s t demonstrated that the correlations for both shame,
t (104) = 3.81 , p < .001, and guilt , t (101) = 2.81 , p = .003 , were statistically significantly

different. Table 8 also shows that the part correlations between women's corresponding
emotion scores are not consistently significantly different from their "opposing" emotion
scores.
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Table 9

Relation Be/ween Men 's Guilt and Shame Proneness Scores on the TOSCA-2 and GRTOSCA (NUIIBD and MUI/ED Scenarios )
GR-TOSCA NUI /BD Scenarios, n = 88
TOSCA -2

Shame residual

Guilt residual

shame
residual

.60a**

-.36b**

guilt
residual

-.35a**

.54b**

GR-TOSCA MUI/BD Scenarios, n = 89
TOSCA -2

Shame residual

Guilt residua l

TOSCA -2 sham e
residual

.25a*

.03a

TOSCA-2 guilt
resid ual

-.01 a

.04a

Note. Co rrel at ion s within a row that do not share identical sub script s differ sign ificant ly
atp< .05.
*p < .05. **p <.01.

Men 's scores on the TOSCA-2 were predicted to positivel y correlate with GRTOSCA scores on scenarios that (a) bring disadvantage and are not differentially gender
threatening (NUI/BD), and (b) bring disadvantage and are uniquel y threatening to men 's
identities (MUI/BD). These correlations are presented in Table 9. Although men 's guilt
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and shame proneness scores for the NUI/BD scenarios correlate highly with TOSCA-2
guilt and shame proneness scores, only the shame proneness scores reached the .05 level
of statis tical significance for the GR-TOSCA MUI/BD scenarios. Because the
correlations between men's TOSCA-2 and GR-TOSCA guilt and shame proneness scores
were suspiciously low, scatterplots were visually inspected for nonlinear relationships.
These visual inspections did not suggest that these variables were related in a nonlinear
fashion. Table 9 also shows that the part correlations between men's corresponding
emotion scores are significantly different from their "opposing " emotion scores only for
the NUl/BD scenarios.
To summarize, these correlations provide substantial evidence for the concurrent
validity of the GR-TOSCA. The overall correlations between the TOSCA-2 and GRTOSCA guilt and shame scores, indicate that the two instruments appear to be measuring
the same constructs. Furthermore, specific predictions (except where noted) regarding
ihese correlations were also borne out, indicating that the manipulations of disadvantage
and gender relevant threat built into the GR-TOSCA function at least partly as expected
in terms of their effect on guilt and shame proneness scores.

Objective 2: Gender Differences in Shame
Proneness Scores on the GR-TOSCA

The secon d objective of this thesis was to examine whether gender differences in
shame would be found only when the gender-relevant identity was threatened. The
questions specifically addressed were: (a) were women ' s shame proneness scores on the
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GR-TOSCA higher than men ' s in the FUI condition? (b) were men's shame proneness
scores on the GR-TOSCA higher than women's in the MUI condition? and (c) was there
no significant gender difference for shame proneness scores in the NUI condition?
Together , these three questions imply that a statistically significant Gender x Gender
Relevant Threat interaction should have been found for participants ' shame ratings. To
address this objective, participants' averaged ratings of the degree to which they thought
scenarios would elicit shame-related behaviors and cognitions were subjected to a mixeddesign 2 x 3 x 2 MANOV A, representing the factorial combination of Gender (male
versus female) x Gender Relevant Threat (male unwanted identity versus female
unwanted identity versus gender-neutral unwanted identity) x Disadvantage (brought
disadvantage versus did not bring disadvantage) , treating the latter two as within-subjects
variables (n = 187).
Importantly , the anticipated Gender x Gender Relevant Threat interaction was not
found for the shame proneness scores , which failed to support the predictions derived
from the second objective . This MANOVA did, however , reveal a statistically
significant main effect for the gender relevant threat variable , F (2, 184) = 60.42 ,
p < .001, ri2= .40. Participants ' average shame proneness scores resulting from the

scenarios in the NUI cell (M = 4.13, SD = 1.06) were lower than those resulting from
scenarios in both the FUI (M = 4.51, SD = 1.1) and MUI (M

=

4.39 , SD= 1.23) cells.

There was also a main effect for the disadvantage variable, F =(I, 185) = 307.85,
p < .001, ri2= .63. The average shame proneness scores derived from scenarios in the did

not bring disadvantage cells (M = 4.04, SD= 1.19) were lower than those resulting from
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the brought disadvantage scenarios (M = 4.64, SD= 1.06). Finally, there was a
significant interaction between the disadvantage variable and the gender-relevant threat
variable , F

=

(2, 184)

=

10.24 , p < .001, ri2 = .10. Although the main effect of the

disadvantage variable revealed that shame ratings were greater when the event brought
disadvantage to another, the Gender Relevant Threat x Disadvantage interaction
suggested that the latter difference appeared for the MUI and NUI scenarios but was the

opposite for the FUI scenarios . Figure 3 displays these results.
To confirm whether there was a simple main effect of the disadvantage variable at
each level of the gender relevant threat variable , three MANOVAs and effect sizes were
calculated for participants ' shame proneness scores. As expected, there was a significant
main effect for the disadvantage variable at the MUI level, F ( 1, 201) = 152.8 ,
2

p < .001 , 11 = .43 , and at the NUI level , F (1 , 197) = 263 . 16, p < .001 , ri2 = .57 . There was
also a significant main effect of the disadvantage variable at the FUI level ,
2

F ( 1, 201) = 22 .66 , p < .001 , 11 = . 10 with shame ratings statistically significantly higher

for the DBD cell than the BD cell. This latter finding was particularly unexpected .
Although the difference between shame ratings was statistically significant , the effect
size is relatively small.
A corollary of the second objective was to examine whether any gender
differences in shame proneness could be accounted for by gender differences in
perceptions of unwanted identity. Because the above analysis did not reveal a gender
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Figure 3. Average shame ratings for all scenario types on the GR-TOSCA.
Note. MUI = Male Unwanted Identity , FUI = Female Unwanted Identity

difference in shame proneness , results pertaining to the corollary did not need to be fully
examined. It should be remembered , however , that the analyses pertaining to the
effectiveness of the shame-inducing condition (i.e., perceptions of whether the scenarios
represented "unwanted identities ") did not reveal any gender differences in perceptions of
these threats . It could be argued, therefore , that the absence of gender differences in the
perception of unwanted identities in the different conditions is what contributed to the
failure to find gender differences in shame proneness.
The failure to find the anticipated gender differences in shame proneness on the
GR-TOSCA led the author to ask whether there was evidence for gender differences in
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shame proneness on the more widely accepted instrument used in this area, the TOSCA2. To address this issue , a one-way ANOVA was also calculated to determine whether
men's and women's shame proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 are significantly different,
as would be expected from the literature. This test revealed that the difference between
women's and men's shame proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 were not statistically
significantly different in this sample, F(I , 196) = .01,p = .93, 112 = .00. Results in the
present sample are not showing the expected gender difference in shame proneness, even
on an instrument widely used in the literature, and on which gender differences in shame
proneness are typically found.
To summarize the findings pertaining to the second objective: the prediction that
there would be a Gender x Gender Relevant Threat interaction would be found for shame
proneness scores was not supported. Even more surprising was the fact that participants '
average shame ratings for the FUI/DBD cell were higher than those for the FUI/BD cell.

Objective 3: Gender Differences in Guilt
Proneness Scores on the GR-TOSCA

The third objective of the thesis was to examine whether women scored higher in
guilt proneness on the GR-TOSCA than men when their behavior was perceived to
disadvantage another. A corollary to the third objective was to ask whether any obtained
gender differences in guilt proneness could be accounted for by gender differences in
perceptions of disadvantaging others. To address whether there were gender differences
in guilt proneness, participants' average ratings of the degree to which they thought

54
scenarios would elicit guilt-related behaviors and cognitions were subjected to a mixeddesign 2 x 3 x 2 MANOV A, representing the factorial combination of Gender (male
versus female) x Gender Relevant Threat (male unwanted identity versus female
unwanted identity versus gender-neutral unwanted identity) x Disadvantage (brought
disadvantage versus did not bring disadvantage) , treating the latter two as within subjects
factors (n = 187).
As with the shame proneness scores, there were no statistically significant effects
of gender or interaction of gender with either the gender relevant threat or the
disadvantage variables for participants ' guilt proneness scores. This indicates that the
predictions derived for Objective 3 were not supported. A statistically significant main
effect was found for the gender-relevant threat variable , F (2, 190) = 130.37, p < .001,
112 = .58 . Participants ' average guilt ratings were highest for the scenarios in the FUI cell
(M = 5.32, SD = 1), second highest for scenarios in he NUI cell (M = 4.94, SD = 1.01),

and lowest for those scenarios in the MUI cell (M = 4.67, SD = 1.11). A statistically
significant main effect was also found for the disadvantage variable for the guilt ratings,
F = (1 , 191) = 421. 13, p < .000, ri2= .3 1. Across all three unwanted identity cells (MUI,

FUI and NUI) participants' guilt ratings were statistically significantly higher for those
scenarios that additionally brought disadvantage (M= 5.46, SD= .95) than those that did
not (M = 4.50, SD= 1.I 3). Finally, a statistically significant interaction was found
between the gender relevant threat variable and the disadvantage variable ,
2

F(2 , 190) = 40.75 , p < .001, 11 = .65. As Figure 4 illustrates, this interaction reflects the

fact that guilt was rated higher in the brought disadvantage cell than in the did not bring
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disadvantage cell , especially when the scenarios threatened a FUI as opposed to
threatening a MUI or a NUI.
A corollary of the third objective was to examine whether any gender differences
in guilt ratings could be accounted for by gender differences in the perceptions of
disadvantaging others. Because the above analysis did not reveal a gender difference in
guilt, results pertaining to the corollary did not need to be examined. As with the shame
ratings , the most important prediction for this objective , that there would be a Gender x
Gender Relevant Threat interaction was not supported. The failure to find any significant
gender differences in guilt proneness on the GR-TOSCA led the author to ask whether
there were gender differences in guilt on the more widely accepted TOSCA-2, as would
be expected from the literature. The one-way ANOV A, treating gender as the between
subjects factor, of participants TOSCA-2 guilt proneness scores revealed that the
difference between women's and men 's guilt proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 were not
statistically significantly different in this sample, F(I,

193) = .16, p = .69, 112 = .00. This

result may shed some light on the nonsignificant gender effects in the guilt MANOV A
above but indicating that the participants ' responses differ in important ways from those
typically found in the guilt literature. Results in the present sample are not showing the
expected gender difference in guilt proneness , even on an instrument widely used in the
literature, and on which gender differences in guilt proneness are typically found.
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Figure 4. Average guilt ratings for all sce nario types on the GR-TOSCA.
No te. MUI = Male Unwanted Identity , FUI = Female Unwanted Identity .
Objective 4: Gender Differences in Guilt and Shame Proneness Scores
on the GR-TOSCA as a Function of Gender-Relevant

Threat

The fourth objective of the thesis was to examine whether gender differences in
shame or guilt scores are small in size in situations not representing a gender-relevant
threat or not bringing disadvantage to others. As was seen from the MANOV As reported
earlier, there were no statistically significant effects of gender for the analyses of the
shame or the guilt scores. The failure to find statistically significant effects of gender
could reflect a problem with power or it could simply mean that the gender differences
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are weak in magnitude . As one further check, Cohen's d effect sizes were calculated for
the differences between males ' and female guilt and shame scores on the GR-TOSCA for
each level of the gender relevant threat variable (MUI, FUI, and NUI) and the
disadvantage variable (BD and DBD). These effect sizes are reported in Table I 0, which
clearly shows that men's and women's guilt and shame proneness scores on each of the
situation types in the GR-TOSCA do not differ significantly; none of the effect sizes
approached the a priori effect size significance level of .20.

Table IO

Effect Sizes.for the Differences Between Men's and Women's Guilt and Shame Scores on
the GR-TOSCA
Cohen 's d
Scenario Type

Shame

Guilt

MUI

.08

.01

FUI

.04

.09

NUI

.01

.13

BD

.04

.14

DBD

.01

.01

Note. MUI= Male Unwanted Identity , FUI = Female Unwanted Identity, NUI = Gender
Neutral Unwanted Identity , BD = Brings Disadvantage , DBD = Doesn 't Bring
Disadvantage.
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Objective 5: Relationship Between Sex Role
Endorsement, Guilt, and Shame

The fifth objective of the thesis was to ascertain the relationship between
participants ' endorsement of stereotypical gender personality characteristics and their
guilt and shame proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 and the GR-TOSCA, thereby testing
the assertion that the gender roles to which individuals subscribe play a major role in
impacting these scores.
In the literature that discusses the possible reasons women are typically found to
be more guilt and shame prone than men , one argument is that women (relative to men)
are often more sensitive to identity threats and are more sensitive to causing problems
for others. The tendenc y to endorse so-called "fe minin e" gender role traits is, in fact,
frequently operationalized in precisely these ways. For example, on the BSRI , a person
who endorses feminine traits is one who professes beliefs about the self that correspond
to shame-relevant behaviors (e.g., shy, yielding) and that would endorse guilt-relevant
actions because they have hurt others (e.g. , eager to soothe hurt feelings). On the other
hand , a person who endorses masculine traits on the BSRI is not professing to be very
sensitive to shame- or guilt-relevant concerns (e.g. , some of the BSRI items that indicate
ma sculinit y are willing to take a stand , self-reliant, or aggressive).
It was , therefore , expected that , in this sample, men would score higher on the
masculininty scale of the BSRI than women , and women would score higher on the
femininity scale of the BSRI than men . As with the other hypotheses regarding gender
differences in this thesis , the resu lts were not as expected . Neither difference between
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men's and women's scores on BSRI masculinity, F(l, 194) = 2.09 , p = .15, 112 = .01, nor
the difference between men's and women's scores on BSRI femininity, F(l , 196)

=

1.17,

2

p = .28, 11 = .01, were significant.

Examined next were the hypotheses that (a) BSRI femininity would be positively
correlated with both guilt and shame proneness , and (b) the latter scores should be
negatively correlated with BSRI masculinity scores. To test these hypotheses , scores on
the BSRI masculinity and femininity scales were correlated with shame and guilt
proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 and the GR-TOSCA. Both zero-order and pa11
co1Telations were calculated to test these predictions . Hotelling's I tests were also
calculated to test the equality of these correlations, as appropriate. The results are
presented in Table 11.

Table 11

Corre lation s of BSRI Masculinity (BSRI M) and Femininity (BSRJ F) Subsca les with
TOSCA-2 Guilt and Shame Proneness Scores
TOSCA-2 Shame
(zero-order)

(resid . for guilt)

TOSCA-2 Guilt
(zero-order)

(resid. for shame)

BSRIM
BSRIF

Note. Correlations within a column that do not share identical superscripts differ
significantly at p < .05.
Cell Ns range from 201-205.
*p < .05. **p <.01.
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Table 11 shows that these predictions were only partially supported. The negative
correlation between participants' BSRI masculinity scores and TOSCA-2 shame
proneness scores was significant (when shame was residualized for guilt), as predicted ,
but the significant positive correlations between BSRI masculinity and TOSCA-2 guilt
proneness scores (both zero-order and residualized for shame) was unexpected . The
BSRI femininity scores were positively correlated with TOSCA-2 zero-order shame
proneness scores; however , once TOSCA-2 shame was residualized for guilt, this
correlation was reversed . Participants ' BSRI femininity scores were, as predicted,
significantly positively correlated with TOSCA-2 guilt proneness scores (both zero-order
and residualized for shame) . All things considered, the most salient finding was that a
tendency to endorse feminine traits as measured by the BSRI was strongly related to the
tendency to endorse guilt-relevant responses on the TOSCA-2.
Pearson product moment correlation coefficients were also computed between the
BSRI femininity and masculinity subscales and the shame and guilt proneness scores
from the GR-TOSCA. The hypothese s to be tested were that shame proneness scores on
the GR-TOSCA would be positively associated with BSRI femininity but negatively
associated with BSRI masculinity. Both zero-order and part correlations were calculated
to test these predictions. Hotelling's t tests were also calculated to test the equality of
these correlations, as appropriate. The results for these correlations are presented in
Table 12.
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Table 12

Correlation of BSRJ Masculinity (BSRJ M) and Femininity (BSRI F) Subscales with GRTOSCA Shame and Guilt Proneness Scores
GR-TOSCA Shame
(zero-order)

(resid. for guilt)

GR-TOSCA Guilt
(zero-order)

(resid. for shame)

BSRIM
BSRIF

Note. Correlations within a column that do not share identical superscripts differ
significantly at p < .05.
Cell Ns range from 192-204.
*p < .05. **p <.01.

Table 12 shows that the predictions made regarding the GR-TOSCA in
relationship to BSRI masculinity and femininity were only partially confirmed. Scores
for masculinity were negatively correlated with shame proneness (as predicted) , at least
01:ce shame proneness was residualized for its association with guilt proneness.
However , guilt proneness was actually positively associated with masculinity for both the
unresidualized and residualized guilt scores. The latter finding is counter to predictions.
Shame proneness scores were positively correlated with BSRI femininity scores for the
zero-order correlations , but negatively correlated for the part correlations, another finding
that runs counter to prediction. However , femininity scores were positively associated
with guilt proneness , as predicted. In all , if one bases conclusions primarily on the part
correlations, which provide the most uncontaminated test of each emotion's relationship
to gender role ascriptions, shame proneness is negatively linked to masculine and
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feminine endorsements, whereas guilt proneness is positively linked to masculine and
especially to feminine endorsements.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION

The analyses reported for Objective 1 in the Results chapter of the thesis provide
some encouraging evidence for the validity and reliability of the GR-TOSCA.

Although

not all of the hypotheses regarding validity and reliability were supported, the evidence
indicated that the scenarios within the GR-TOSCA appeared to be consistently measuring
the constructs they were intended to measure .
Seventeen of these original 22 scenarios were retained in the instrument based on
participants ' ratings of the degree to which the scenarios represented each of the six cells
intended. This selection process left the MUJ/BD, MUI/DBD and NUI /DBD conditions
with only two scenarios representing them. Ideally , each condition would have contained
a greater (and equal) number of scenarios , but creating situations that were perceived by
participants as intended was a challenging task. The fact that the 22 scenarios used in the
thesis had already been pilot-tested and selected from an even larger pool of scenarios
indicated that the selection of the "best " scenarios for the GR-TOSCA was an ongoing
process. Future versions of the GR-TOSCA should present additional scenarios in each
of the cells. Nonetheless , the MANOV As conducted as omnibus tests of the
manipulations of disadvantage and gender relevant threat indicated that the 17 remaining
scenarios represented each of the six scenarios types, as intended.
These scenarios selected for the GR-TOSCA also appeared to be reliable in their
measurement.

A test of internal consistency showed that the shame proneness, guilt
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proneness , unwanted identity and disadvantage subscales all performed very well in this
regard. A test-retest analysis also suggested that participants' scores on the GR-TOSCA
remained very stable over a 3-week period. This finding, however , was limited
somewhat by the lack of males in the test-retest sample.
Based on this evidence, the GR-TOSCA appeared to be reliable in its
measurement. But was it actually measuring guilt and shame proneness? Substantial
evidence for the concurrent validity of the instrument was provided by correlating
participants' guilt and shame proneness scores (overall) on the GR-TOSCA with that of
the TOSCA-2. These correlations showed that these scales from the GR-TOSCA
correlated highly with the same scales of the TOSCA-2, especially after the strong
common variance shared by guilt and shame was accounted for. A more critical
demonstration of the internal validity of the GR-TOSCA than these overall correlations
was the correlations of the guilt and shame proneness scores derived from the specific
scenario types on the GR-TOSCA with the guilt and shame proneness scores on the
TOSCA-2. The reader will recall that the GR-TOSCA was designed to redress the
confound hypothesized to exist in the TOSCA-2 between gender-specific unwanted
identities and disadvantaging others. Therefore it was important to support specific
hypotheses regarding how the guilt and shame proneness scores derived from specific
scenario types on the GR-TOSCA correlated with the guilt and shame proneness scores
on the TOSCA-2 . All but two of these hypotheses were supported by these correlations,
providing further support for the internal validity of the GR-TOSCA.
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The GR-TOSCA developed for this thesis was thus shown to perform well in
terms of the criteria that needed to be met to establish its internal consistency reliability ,
test-retest reliability (albeit with a sample of primarily women) , representation of
different types of identity threats, ability to differentiate guilt-inducing conditions , and
thus its validity as a measure of guilt and shame proneness. The question still remained ,
however , as to whether the GR-TOSCA was a valid indication of the types of situations
in which women relative to men actually evidenced more guilt or shame proneness ,
which was the focal question addressed in Objectives 2, 3, and 4. The reader will recall
that scenarios were selected to represent the MUI, FUI , and NUI cells based on
participants ' ratings of the degree to which these scenarios represented unwanted
identities for men and women or neither. Participants reported that scenarios in the MUI
condition were a greater unwanted identity for men , that scenarios in the FUI condition
were a greater unwanted identity for women , and that scenarios in the NUI condition
were not differentiated as gender-relevant unwanted identities. It was, therefore ,
hypothesized that men would score as more shame prone on scenarios in the MUI
condition , women would score as more shame prone in the FUI condition and that there
would not be a gender difference in shame proneness scores for the FUI condition . Yet
these expected gender differences were not found, either in terms of statistically
significant interactions between gender and gender relevant threat or in the effect sizes
obtained for that interaction. The same was true of the expected gender differences in
guilt proneness derived from scenarios representing the BD and DBD conditions.
Scenarios were chosen to represent these conditions using participants' ratings of the
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degree to which scenarios "caused trouble" for others (the operationalization for bringing
disadvantage). Given that bringing disadvantage to others is theorized to be a greater
societal taboo for women than men, at least in the U.S., it was expected that women's
guilt proneness scores would be higher than men's for those scenarios in the BD
condition. This expected gender difference was also not found. This raised the question
of why the anticipated gender differences were not found.
Why were the expected gender differences in guilt and shame proneness across
the GR-TOSCA conditions not found? Several possible explanations to this question
were be explored. The first possibility is that there were simply not enough "goo d"
scenarios representing the MUI and FUI conditions in the GR-TOSCA as a result of
selection procedures that were too liberal. That is, it may be the case that the magnitude
of the difference in participants' perceptions of gender-specific unwanted identities was
just not large enough to result in differences in guilt and shame proneness scores. As
previously mentioned , creating convincing , interesting scenarios that represented each of
the six conditions proved to be a real challenge. Although the 22 scenarios used in the
present research had "s urvived " being pilot-tested twice , five of these still had to be
discarded in the thesis. Liberal selection criteria (effect size differences of .20 or greater)
were used , in part, to ensure that each condition was represented by at least two
scenarios. Ideally , a larger number of scenarios would have been used in the thesis to
ensure that more scenarios, perhaps meeting a more stringent selection criterion, would
be assigned to each condition. But presenting participants with more scenarios would
create additional problems. Even with only 22 scenarios, the length of the GR-TOSCA
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was substantial. Completing the 22-item GR-TOSCA along with the other instruments
administered in this research took participants an estimated 2 hours. Asking volunteers to
spend more time than this is unreasonable and unlikely to produce quality responses. If
subsequent research can continue to construct and refine scenarios that better capitalize
on gender-specific unwanted identities, perhaps a more stringent criterion could be used
to assign scenarios to each condition (e.g., larger effect sizes). Then, the magnitude of
the difference in participants' perceptions of gender-specific unwanted identities might
correspondingly be large enough to provide more power for statistical testing thereby
finding the expected gender differences in guilt and shame proneness scores.
A second possible explanation for the lack of gender differences in guilt and
shame on the GR-TOSCA concerns the way in which scenarios were selected to
represent differential gender threats and gender relevant differences in disadvantaging
others. Recall that scenarios were chosen to represent the MUI, FUI and NUI conditions
based on participants' ratings of the extent to which they represented an unwanted
identity for the "typical male" and the "typical female." Scenarios were not, however,
chosen based on the extent to which any of the scenarios were specifically threatening to
their own identity as a man or a woman. There may well be a disconnect between
perceptions of what is stereotypically threatening to men or women as a group versus
what is personally threatening to the self as a unique man or woman. If this is true, then
this might explain the failure to find differences in shame proneness as a function of
participant gender. In essence, the failure to tailor selection of the scenarios to
participants' personal gender identity might have obscured the gender differences that
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could have otherwise been detected.

This observation helped to make sense of the

discrepancy in the findings obtained in the present thesis when compared to those
reported by Ferguson, Stegge , Eyre , Vollmer , and Ashbaker (2000). In the latter study,
the expected Gender x Gender Relevant Threat interaction was obtained for participants '
shame proneness ratings. However, the selection of scenario to represent gender relevant
threats was based on participants rating of the extent to which they personally came
across as possessing undesirable characteristic in that situation. Scenarios were selected
to represent FUis only when the women as a group had agreed that the scenario was
threatening to their identity or as representative of MUis only when the men as a group
were agreed that the scenarios were threatening to their identity .

The same problem

may also exist for the scenarios representing the bring disadvantage and does not bring
disad vantage conditions, resulting in the lack of gender differ ences in guilt proneness
scores across these conditions. Scenarios were chosen to represent these conditions
based on participants ' ratings of the extent to which they thought the "typical male " or
"typical female" would be causing trouble for others in that situation. It may be the case
that the focus on "typical " individuals , as opposed to asking participants how they would
feel personally , may have obscured any gender differences in guilt proneness.
In retrospect , the null findings obtained in the thesis regarding gender differences
in guilt and shame proneness might be a result of asking participants the wrong
manipulation check questions. These problems may have resulted in the inability to
demonstrate that gender differences in shame proneness were a function of the genderrelevance of the threat or that gender differences in guilt proneness were a function of the
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extent disadvantage was perceived to be brought. But there might be an unintended
benefit of these results. The GR -TOSCA as it is presently designed produces no
significant gender differences in shame or guilt and might thus be considered a nicely
gender-balanced instrument for use in future research.
These explanations for the failure to find gender differences in guilt and shame
proneness on the GR-TOSCA need to be weighed, however, in light of other
nondifferences found. Importantly, it will be recalled that there also were no gender
differences in either emotion for the TOSCA-2 in the present sample of participants.
This was a disturbing finding that deserved at least an attempt at explanation.
As described in the Method chapter, participants completed all instruments via the
Internet and then recorded their responses on pencil and paper. This needs to be
recognized as a potential limitation to the present results , or at least the ability to compare
these results with others' findings, because all previous studies in this area have relied on
paper-and-pencil delivery methods as opposed to using the Internet. Although the
Internet-based delivery method was used to reduce the costs of administration (e.g.,
photocopy expenses) , it was still important to ask whether this particular methodology
somehow affected participants' responses. There were no clear-cut answers to this
question. It should be noted, however, that a study was conducted by Batis (2002) with
exactly the same group of general psychology students as the source of his sample. Batis
administered the TOSCA-2 to these students using either paper-and-pencil or Internet
delivery. He found the traditionally obtained gender difference in scores on the TOSCA2 in both delivery modes, that is, the females scored as both more guilt and shame prone
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on this instrument regardless of whether they had completed the measure via the Internet
or paper-and-pencil.

Given the strong correlations obtained in this thesis between

TOSCA-2 scores and GR-TOSCA scores, it seemed reasonable to argue that Batis also
would have found similar effects for the GR-TOSCA. In all, then , the delivery mode as
such did not seem to be a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy in results found in
this thesis when compared to previous studies.
The failure to replicate gender differences in guilt and shame scores in this sample
was one of two inconsistencies found when compared to prior research. The second
discrepancy concerned the extremely high correlations found between guilt and shame
proneness scores in the present sample. The correlations between guilt and shame
proneness in the present sample were .60 for the TOSCA-2, (df= 201,p <.001) and .83
for the GR-TOSCA (df= 190, p < .001). These associations were very strong when
compared to others' findings, who typically reported correlations on the order of .45
between TOSCA-2 guilt versus shame proneness scores. These associations were even
stronger when compared to Batis 's results in his Internet sample from the same class of
students (r = .17). A reasonable question, therefore, was whether some aspect of the
administration procedure used in the present thesis introduced some form of bias in the
data . One possible explanation was that the procedures made it clear to the participants '
that gender differences were under investigation in the research and that this knowledge
somehow influenced their responses. For example, participants may have (consciously or
unconsciously) responded to the instruments in such a way that reduced any gender
differences. The salient gender component of the research may also have acted as a
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prime, causing participants ' to choose answers that maximized social desirability . Given
that "feminine" items emphasizing, for example, nurturance and caring, were likel y to be
perceived as more socially desirable , gender differences may have been minimized.
Although no gender differences in guilt and shame proneness were found, there
several statistically significant diff erences in guilt and shame proneness as a function of
scenario type were found. First, participants' shame proneness ratings in the gender
neutral condition were greater than those for either the FUI condition or the MUI
condition. Recall that the scenarios in both the MUI and FUI conditions were
constructed using Eisler and Skidmore ' s (1987) research on gender stress. The scales
that Eis ler developed focused on relatively significant life events , such as losing one 's job
and the inability to perform sexually . The creation of scenar ios in the NUI condition
required the author to imagine situations that wou ld not be diff erentially gender
threatening , such as spilling soup into someone's lap or making a social faux pas. It
seemed possible that the smaller shame-proneness scores in this latter condition might be
a result of the differential importance or significance of the situations presented.

Those

situations described in the gender relevant conditions may simply have been greater
threats to the unwanted identities of the participants because of their relative importance
or impact on one's life.
The results also showed that participants scored as more shame prone for those
situations that brought disadvantage versus those that did not bring disadvantage .
Although it was hypothesized that the scenarios in the bring disadvantage condition
would represent additional unwanted identities for women only, causing their shame
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scores to be higher than those of men, a statistically significant main effect for gender
was not found. This finding suggested that the scenarios in the bring disadvantage
scenarios represented additional unwanted identities for both women and men.
A main effect for guilt proneness scores was also found for the unwanted identity
condition, such that participants' guilt proneness scores were highest for those scenarios
representing FUis, second highest for scenarios representing NUis and lowest for
scenarios representing MUis. This particular finding may have been a result of the biases
introduced by the administration procedures mentioned above. If participants were
responding to these scenarios with the intention of making socially desirable responses ,
they may have been inclined to report feeling especially guilty in the scenarios in the FUI
condition. For example, participants may have over-reported feeling guilty in response to
scenarios base on Eisler ' s "fear of not being nurturant " to appear compassionate and
sensitive.
And finally , participants guilt proneness scores also showed a main effect for the
bring disadvantage condition , such that their guilt proneness scores were higher for those
scenarios that brought disadvantage versus those that did not bring disadvantage. As
described in the Literature Review chapter , it is believed that women are socialized in the
U.S. to feel more guilt in response to disadvantaging others. Therefore it was
hypothesized that women would score as more guilt prone than men in response to those
scenarios that bring disadvantage versus those that do not. As with all of the
hypothesized gender differences, this prediction was not borne out, suggesting that both
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men and women felt more guilt in response to those situations that brought disadvantage
to others.
The final objective of the thesis was to ascertain whether the gender roles to
which individuals subscribe played a major role in impacting guilt and shame proneness
on the GR-TOSCA . It was argued women (relative to men) are socialized in the U.S. to
be more sensitive to identity threats and to causing problems for others . The tendency to
endorse these "feminine" gender role traits is operationalized in the BSRI with items that
correspond to shame-relevant behaviors such as being "s hy" and "y ielding " and guiltrelevant behavior such as being "eager to soothe hurt feelings." One who endorses
masculine traits on the BSRJ is not professing to be very sensitive to shame- or guiltrelevant concerns by indicating that he or she is "w illing to take a stand," "se lf-reliant "
and "agg res sive." Given this , it was hypoth esize d that BSRI femininity scores would be
positively correlated with both the guilt and shame proneness scores on the TOSCA-2
and ihe GR-TOSCA , whereas the latter scores should be negatively correlated with BSRI
masculinity scores . There was little support for this entire pattern of predictions.

In fact ,

the most salient findings for both the TOSCA-2 and the GR-TOSCA were that (a) shame
proneness scores tended to be negatively correlated with endorsements of both masculine
and feminine traits , whereas (b) guilt proneness scores were positively associated with
masculine and especially with feminine gender role endorsements.

The most plausible

interpretation of these findings is that the BSRI is not measuring the types of masculine
or feminine traits that needed to be measured in order to adequately address the original
predictions.

In retrospect, a measure of gender role endorsement that better corresponded
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with Eisler and Skidmore's (1987) Gender Role Stressors (used to create the GR-TOSCA
scenarios) should have been used to test these predictions. Eisler and Skidmore ' s gender
stressors tended to focus on inadequacies or undesirable aspect of gender identity (e.g.,
fear of intellectual inferiority, fear of victimization), which do not align well with the
gender identities measured by the BSRI. In hindsight, then, it seemed likely that the
wrong choice of gender role endorsement (the BSRI) was likely made to test the original
predictions.
What , then , do the positive guilt-BSRI masculinity and femininity correlations
mean? A good case can be made that the BSRI masculinity score was really measuring a
person ' s tendency to subscribe to autonomous , agentic attributes -- instrumental traits that
most people would like to possess , at least in U.S. society (Levit , 1991). A good case can
also be made that many , though certainly not all, of the BSRI femininity items are
assessing the person's tendency to act in a communal manner (represented in the BSRI by
items such as " loyal ," "understanding ," "sympathetic ," "eager to soothe hurt feelings ") -which also is a desirable response tendency (Levit , 1991 ). Thus , the BSRI items are
really assessing, for the most part, a person ' s tendency to endorse desirable components
to either the masculine or feminine role (Bakan, 1966). Similarly , a good case can be
made that guilt proneness , at least as operationalized in the TOSCA-2 and GR-TOSCA ,
was a desirable way to behave. After all, guilt proneness was indexed in both of these
measures by the person ' s tendency to endorse reparative behaviors, relationshiprestorative behaviors , and behaviors that put the person in control of the untoward
situation.

Thus, the fact that guilt proneness was positively correlated with the BSRI's
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operationalization of positively valued masculine and feminine traits may simply have
meant that tendencies to endorse desirable ways of responding or "being" were associated
with one another. This interpretation additionally made sense of the negative part
correlations between shame-proneness and the BSRI masculinity and femininity scores.
Shame proneness was operationalized in the TOSCA-2 and the GR-TOSCA by the
person's tendency to endorse thoughts or behaviors that denigrated the self or avoided
restorative , reparative action -- which certainly was not the most desirable way of
reacting to these situations. Thus, the fact that shame proneness was negatively correlated
with the BSRI's operationalization of positively valued masculine and feminine traits
may simply have meant that tendencies to endorse desirable versus undesirable ways of
responding or "being " were oppositely associated .
This research had several additional limitations due to the nature of the sampling
and data collection procedures . First , the composition of the sample used limits the
generaiizability of any findings to a very specific population of undergraduate
psychology students in a particular location. Ultimately , the goal in studying these
emotions was to understand how they functioned in a much larger population , but
generalizations from this research must be limited to the narrow population from which
this sample was drawn. Secondly , there were limitations imposed upon the validity of the
measures of the constructs examined due to the use of self-report in data collection.
Although self-report measures can potentially be biased , the instruments outlined in this
thesis were of the best measures of these emotions that were available. Finally , because
the primary goal of the proposed research was to explore the weaknesses of existing
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literature in the area , and to expand upon it, it was necessary to rely on similar samples,
instruments , and methodologies.
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Date created: October 25th, 2000

Informed Consent
Identifying the Bases for Gender Differences in Guilt and Shame

Introduction/Purpose
This study is being conducted as part of Shawn Edmondson's thesis. The project
is being supervised by Professor Tamara J. Ferguson in the Department of Psychology at
Utah State University. This study is meant to find out more about people's reactions in
certain situations. You have been asked to take part because we will be using college
students as participants. In all , we hope to have about 200 college students participate.

Procedures
You will be given four questionnaires to comp lete. They assess your reactions in
different types of situations and/or your fee lings in general. Completing all four
questionnaires should take you less than one hour.

New Findings
Should there be any changes in the risks or benefits involved in the study during
your participation , we will contact you immediately . We will do this so that you may
consider whether you wish to continue your participation. If new information is obtained
that is relevant or useful to you, or if the procedures and/or methods change at any time
throughout this study , your consent to continue participating in this study will be obtained
again.

Based on previous experience , we do not expect there to be any risks.

Benefits
Although it may not directly benefit you, your participation in this research may
help benefit psychology's understanding people's feelings and general reactions. The
study is of benefit to you in that your course professor may offer you extra credit toward
the course for your participation.
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Date created: October 25 111,2000

Informed Consent
Identifying the Bases for Gender Differences in Guilt and Shame

Explanation & offer to answer questions
Shawn Edmondson has explained this study to you and answered your questions .
If you have other questions or research-related problems, you may reach Professor
Ferguson at 797-3272.

Voluntary nature of participation
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or
withdraw at any time without consequence or loss of benefits .
Confidentiality
We guarantee that your participation is confidential. You will never be identified
by name. Only the investigative team will have access to any data and all data are kept in
locked filing cabinets . The data will be kept until such time that it is thoroughly
processed and pubiished. Please also note that an individual 's data are never reported .
Results are always processed across a group of people. We abide by these rules of
confidentiality because it is our ethical responsibility to you to do so. Records also are
kept confidential consistent with federal and state regulations
IRB Approval Statement
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the protection of human subjects at
Utah State University has reviewed and approved this research project.
Copy of Consent
You have been given two copies of the Informed Consent. Please sign both
copies. Return one signed copy to Shawn Edmondson. Retain the other copy for your
files.
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Date created: October 25t11,2000

Informed Consent
Identifying the Bases for Gender Differences in Guilt and Shame

Investigator Statement
You certify that the research study has been explained to me by Shawn
Edmondson. I understand the nature and purpose , the possible risks and benefits
associated with taking part in the research study. Any questions that have been raised,
have been answered.

Signature of PI & Student Researcher

Dr. Tamara Ferguson
Principal Investigator
797-3 272

R. Shawn Edmondson
Student Researcher
797-3485

Signature of Subject
By signing below you agree to participate :

Subject ' s signature _______________

Date ________

_
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The following is one of the three male versions (containing the original 22 scenarios) of
the GR-TOSCA delivered via HTML on the WWW . Following the GR-TOSCA
questions is a one-page example of the "bubble " answer form onto which participants
recorded their answers.

Below you will be asked to 'read different situations and imagine they have happened
to you. Some of these situations may seem irrelevant because it's unlikely you would
find yourself ii'} that situation. For example, a situation may refer to your spouse and
you may not be married. That's okay - it<loesn't matter if the situation doesn't
accurately reflect your current circumstances. Just Imagine that the situation is
applicable to you. You MUST work alone-don't let anyone influence your answers!
For each of the situat ions you will be asked questions like these :

- In this situation, to what extent does a typical male come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
- In this situation, to what extent does a typical female come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
- Let's say that this situation really happened to a typical male. To what extent did this
typical male cause trouble for others involved in the situation?
-Let's say that this situation really happened to a typical female. To what extent did
this typical female cause trouble for others involved in the situation?
These questions ask you about the "typical male" or "typical female." With the word
"typical," we mean most of the males or females you know around your age. You
should be thinking of the many males you know or the many females you know. All
the questions will be referring to the person indicated by the (X).
These questions also ask about "causing trouble" for others. Think of the word
"trouble" as meaning: hurt them, hurt their feelings, Interfered with their welfare In
some way, or caused them problems.
Please mark all of your answers on the bubble form entitled GR-TOSCA Completely fill the
bubbles !!Vitheitper a pencil or pen. PLEASE, take the task seriously and do not mark :
"bogus" answers . Let's begin.

1a) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
c,

%;
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undesirable characteristics?
4

5

6

a little

moderately

quite a bit

7
•xtremely

1b) Let's say that this situation mally happened to you - that is, you are (X). Towhat
extent do you feel you "caused *'ouble" for others involved in the situation?
7
ectremely

1c) In this situation, to what exta1t would (X), if he were a typical male, come cross
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
edremely

1d) In this situation, to what exta1t does (X) if she were a typical female, come across
as possessing undesirable charccteristics?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
e;tremely

1e) Let's say that this situation rtally happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation
1
not at all

2
very slightly

3
slightly

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
e>tremely

1f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female . To what
extent did this typical female "ca,se trouble" for others involved in the situation?
5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
exremely

1g)How much wou ld you study harder so you'll play better in,_, the future?
~

not at all

~

2
very slightly

6
quite a bit

7
extemely

1h) How much would you want to just leave the competition and avoid talking to
anyone?
5
moderately

6
quite a bit
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1i) How much would you think you're not smart?
4
a little

1
not at all

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

1j) How much would you feel like you'd let your team down and that they had lost
because of you?
6

1
not at all

quite a bit

7
extremely

2a) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
4
a little

5

6

7

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

2b) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that Is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

3
slightly

4
a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

2c) How much would you think that you need to change the way you act so people
don't think you're homosexual?
1
not at all

3
slightly

4
a little

3
slightly

5
moderately

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

7
extremely

2e) In this situ~tlon, to what extent .would (X), if .he we~ea typical male, come across
" '
···

aspossesslng <undesirable characteristics?

5
moderately

"&c
7
extremely
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2f) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
2

5

7

very slightly

moderately

extremely

2g) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
· extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others Involved in the situation?
4

6

7

a little

quite a bit

extremely

2h) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To
what e,dent did tflis typical female '',cause trouble" for others Involved in the
situation?
6

3

4

5

slightly

a little

moderately

quite

7

a bit

extremely

2i) How much would you feel like you're a failure as a man?
~~~~~~~~~~~~

1

5

7

not at all

moderately

extremely

2j) How much would you feel guilty for making her feel uncomfortable?
1
not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7

very slightly

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

3a) In this situation, to what extent would (X), If he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
6"
quite a bit

7
extremely

3b) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
6

7

quite a bit

extremely
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3c) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others Involved In the situation?
1
not at all

7
extremely

2
very slightly

3d) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who Is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others Involved In the
situation?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

3e) How much would you feel the need to plan a new exercise regime to get back Into
shape?
1
not at all

2

4
a little

very slightly

5

6

7

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

3f) How much would you feel like you wish you could just hide?
1
not at all

3
slightly

4
a little

5

6

7

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

3g) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
1
not at all

2

5

very slightly

moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

3h) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that Is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others Involved In the situation?
3
slightly

4
a little

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

5
moderately

7
extremely

7
eJ<tremely

3j}How much would you worry that your significant other's feelings will be hurt ,
because you can't use the gift?
·
4

5

7
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not at all

very slightly

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

4a) In this situation, to what extent would (X), If he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
'i(

2
not at all

6
quite a bit

very slightly

7
extremely

4b) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
1
not at all

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

4c) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation?
1
not at all

2

3

4

very slightly

slightly

a little

5

6

7

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

4d) Let's say that this situation reall)'. happened to {X), who is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the
situation?
3

4

5

6

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

4e) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
1
not at all

3

4

5

6

7

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

4f) Let's say that this situation really happened to you -that is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved In the situation?
2

3

4

6

very slightly

slightly

a little

quite a bit

7
extremely
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4g) How much would you feel the need to let your family know how guilty you feel
about the situation?
1

not at all

1

not at all

5

6

7

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

5

7

moderately

extremely

4i) How much would you feel "worthless "?
1

not at all

5

7

moderately

extremely

4j) How much would you think, "It's all my fault that my family is struggling
financially"?
1

not at all

2

5

6

7

very slightly

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

Sa) How much would you want to vow to lose the excess weight?
4

5

a little

moderately

7

6

a bit

quite

extremely

Sb) How much would you want to keep other people from seeing how you look in the
clothes?
5
moderately

7

6

a bit

quite

extremely

Sc) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
5

not at all

moderately

6
quite

a bit

7
extremely
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Sd) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation?
4

1
not at all

a little

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

Se) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
5

7

moderately

extremely

Sf) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
3

4

5

slightly

a little

moderately

7
extremely

Sg) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved In the situation?
2

3

4

5

6

very slightly

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

Sh) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the
situation?
1
not at all

2

3

very slightly

slightly

5
moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

extremely

6

Si) How much would you feel fat and ugly?
1
not at all

2

3

4

very slightly

slightly

a little

7

Sj) How much would you worry that your significant other is embarrassed about your
weight gain?
1
not at all

2

4

5

very slightly

a little

moderately

7
extremely
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6a) How much would you want to apologize for"givlng your friend the "wrong
impression"? '
3
slightly

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

6b) How much would you want to avoid eye contact and just get away from the
situation?
1
not at all

4

a little

7
extremely

5
moderately

6c) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
2
very slightly

3
slightly

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

6d) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

4

a little

7
extremely

5
moderately

6e) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

3
slightly

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

6f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To what
extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation?
2
very slightly

4
a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

6g) In this situation, to what extenf do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
4
a little

6h) Let's say that this situation really happened to you· that is, you are (X). To "'1hat
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1

2

5

6

not at all

very slightly

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

6i) How much would you feel like you're stupid for not seeing this problem coming?
7
extremely

1
not at all

6j) How much would you think,"This is my fault"? 1

3

4

5

6

not at all

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

7a) How much would you feel inadequate?
5

6

7

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

7b) How much would you think, "It's my fault that my spouse and I can't have children ."
2

3

4

5

6

7

very slightly

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

7c) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
1

3

4

5

6

not at all

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

7d) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others Involved in the situation?
6

7

quite a bit

extremely

7e) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
1

2

6

7

not at all

very slightly

quite a bit

extremely
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7f) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
4

a little

5
moderately

7
extremely

7g) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation?
4

a little

5

6

7

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

7h) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X}, who Is a typical female ..To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others Involved in the
situation?
1
not at all

4

5

6

7

a little

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

71}How much would you want to apologize to your spouse?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

3
slightly

4
a little

7j} How much would you want to avoid talking to your spouse about the problem?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

3
slightly

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

.Sb} Let's say that this situat ion really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation?
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1
not at all

2
very slightly

3
slightly

4

a little

5
moderately·

6
quite a bit

7
,xtremely

6

7
Extremely

Sc) How much would you think you're a big baby?
quite a bit

Sd) How much would you feel guilty about calling the neighbors and waking ttem up?
5
moderately

1
not at all

6
quite a bit

7
ectremely

edremely

4

5

a little

moderately

6
quite a bit

4

5
moderately

quite a bit

a little

6

7

7
ertremely

Sg) In this situation, to what extent would (X), If he were a typical male, come a¢ross
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

5

3
slighUy

moderately

6
quite a bit

7
eitremely

Sh) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
1
not at all

2
very slighUy

4

5

a little

moderately

6
quite a bit

7
exremely

Si) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others Involved in the situation ,
2
very slighUy

4

5

a little

moderately

6
quite a bit

7
exremely

Sj) Let's say thafthis situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To what
extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others Involved in the situatio1?
1
not at all

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extemely
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1
not at all

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

6

7
extremely

2
very slightly

1
not at all

5
moderately

quite a bit

9d) How much would you keep your feelings to yourself, not really talking about how
you feel?
1
not at all

4
a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

9e) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
1
not at all

2

3

very slightly

slightly

4
a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

9f) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
4

5

a little

moderately.

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

9g) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble':ior others involved in the situation?
5
moderately

7
extremely
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9h) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who Is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others Involved in the
situation?
3
slightly

7
extremely

5
moderately

9i) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing undesirable
characteristics?
5

3
slightly

7
extremely

moderately

9j) Let's say that this situation really happened to you. that Is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved In the situation?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

5

7
extremely

6
quite a bit

moderately
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10a) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

3
slightly

4
a little

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

10b) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come
across as possessing undesirable characteristics?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

10c) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male: To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation?
4

a little

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

10d) Let's say th~t this situation really happened to (X), whoJs a typical female. To
What extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the
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situation?
5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

10e) How much would you want to offer to take your team out for pizza to make~,
up for
it?
7
extremely

10f) How much would you be unable to make eye contact with your teammates and
would want to just leave the game?
7
extremely

1Og) How much would you worry that your teammates think you're a terrible athlete?
1
not at all

2

4

5

very slightly

a little

moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

1Oh) How much would you worry about making your teammates feel bad because of
your lousy performance?
1
not at all

4

2
very slightly

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

1Oi) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
4

.a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7

extremely

,,

10j) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation?
not at all

2
very slightly

4

5

6

a little

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely
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6
quite a bit

7
extremely

11b) How much would you worry about the difficulties you have caused for your
spouse?
1
not at all

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

11c) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
not at all

5

6

7

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

11d) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved In the situation?
5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

11e) How much would you want to apologize to your family for not being able to finish
the errands?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

3

4

slightly

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

11f) After you get home from the hospital, how much would you want to just be by
yourself and not talk to people?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

3
slightly

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

11g) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across
undesirable characteristics?
as poss~ing
..:.......=;;;;;;;2
very slightly

7
extremely
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not at all

a little

very slightly

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

111)Let's say that this situation really happened to (X}, who Is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others Involved In the situation?

11j) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X}, who is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved In the
situation?
5

6
quite a bit

moderately

7
extremely

12a) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
1

2

3

not at all

very slightly

slightly

4

a little

5

6
quite a bit

moderately

7
extremely

12b) In this situat ion, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come
across as possessing undesirable characteristics?
2
very slightly

4

a little

5

6
quite a bit

moderately

7
extremely

12c) Let'f say that this situation really happened to (X), who Is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble " for others Involved In the situation?
1

2

4

5

6

not at all

very slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

'

7
extremely

12d) Let's say that this situat ion really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the
situation?
4

a little
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12e) How much would you would feel like you were a bad friend?
4
a little

5
moderately

~~~~.-..~------6

quite a bit

7
extremely

12f) How much would you feel guilty that your friend had to go without the money for
so long?
7
extremely

12g) How much would you want to apologize over and over to your friend and
promise to make it up?
1
not at all

12h) How much would you tend to avoid eye contact the next time you see your
friend?
1
not at all

2

5

very slightly

moderately

7
extremely

12i) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
2
not at all

very slightly

3
slightly

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

12j) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation?
1
not at all' '

2

3

very slightly

slightly

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

1~a) In t,l;lissituatt9n, to wl1at extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
6
quite a bit

7
extremely
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13b) Let's say that this situation really happened to you -that Is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved In the situation?
1
not at all

2

7
extremely

very slightly

13c) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?

~--===-.:- .....
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1
not at all

7
extremely

4
a little

13d) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come
across as possessing undesirable characteristics?
5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

13e) Let'e say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation?
2

3

4

very slightly

slightly

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

13f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who Is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the
situation?
1
not at all

3

4

slightly

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

13g) How much would you think, "I'm a clumsy fool."
6
quite a bit

13h) How much would you feel terrible for the if!,COnvenienceyou've caused?
1
not at all

4
a little

6
quite a bit

6

7
extremely
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not at all

very slightly

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

6
quite a bit

extremely

13j) How much would you want to "escape" the restaurant?
5

1
not at all

moderately

1
not at all

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7

7
extremely

14b) How much would you feel like a failure?

.

1
not at all

2
very slightly

3
slightly

4
a little

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

14c) How much would you want to tell your family how guilty you feel about the
situation?
not at all

2
very slightiy

3
slightly

4

5

a little

moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

14d) How much would you want to avoid contact with others so they couldn't see
your situation?
4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

14e) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
4

5

a little

moderately

14f) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what
extent dq you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved tn'the situation?
5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely
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14g) In this situation, to what extent would (X), If he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
5

7
extremely

moderately

14h) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come
across as possessing undesirable characteristics?
,....;;;;;_~_;;;=.;=.~.;;.__;;;;;;.,;;=-~~..;;;;;;;;;;;;

4

5

7

a little

moderately

extremely

141)Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others Involved in the situation?
3
slightly

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

14j) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others Involved in the
situation?

1
not at all

3

4

5

6

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

3
slightly

4

5

a little

moderately

6
quite a bit

extremely

5
moderately

7

7
extremely

15c) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
2

4
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not at all

very slightly

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

15d) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come
across as possessing undesirable characteristics?
7
extremely

15e) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who Is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others Involved In the situation?
4
a little

1
not at all

5

7
extremely

moderately

15f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the
situation?
4
a little

5

6

7

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

15g) How much would you think you are a failure?
3

1
not at all

slightly

4
a little

5

6

7

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

15h) How much would you feel guilty for the inconvenience you've caused others?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

4
a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

1Si) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?

15j) Let's ' say that this situation really happened .to you - that is, you are {X). To what
extent clo''you feel you "caused trouble" for others Involved in the situation?
7
extremely
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16a) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?

16b) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come
across as possessing undesirable characteristics?
1
not at all

2

5

very slightly

moderately

7
extremely

16c) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation?
2

3

4

5

6

7

very slightly

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

16d) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female . To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others Involved in the
situation?
5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

16e) How much would you feel like a terrible student?
4

5

a little

moderately

16f) How.much would you feel like you had let your self down because iou lowered
your GPA?
4

a little

5
moderately

7
extremely

6
quite a bit

-

16g) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?

7
extremely
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_____

16h) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what
.........
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation?
6
quite a bit

2
veryslighUy

6

3
slightly

quite a bit

7
extremely

7
extremely

16j) How much would you be unable to make eye contact with the instructor and
would feel the need to get out of class?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

5

3
slighUy

moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

17a) How much would you feel unmanly?
3
slightly

4

6

7

a little

quite a bit

extremely

17b) How much would you be sorry that you had caused yourself this embarrassment
because you act too feminine?
1
not at all

2
very slighUy

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7

extremely

17c) In this situation, to what extent would (X), If he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

17d) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come
across as possessing undesirable characteristics?
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17e) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved In the situation?
4

5

6

a little

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

17f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved In the
situation?
1
not at all

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

17g) How much would you think that you should start acting more masculine?
7
extremely

7
extremely

5
moderately

1
not at all

171)In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
3

4

slightly

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

17j) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation?
1
not at all

'

~

{

3

4

slightly

a little

5
moderately

.
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2
very slightly
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18a) f-:1owmuch would you feel unlovable and undesirable?
1
not at all

---

6
quite a bit

7
extremely
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4

a little

18c) In this situation, to what exte.ntwould (X), if he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
6

1
not at all

quite a bit

7
extremely

18d) 1nthis situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come
across as possessing undesirable characteristics?
7
extremely

18e) tet's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation?
3
slightly

6

4

a little

quite a bit

7
extremely

18f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the
situation?
1
not at all

2

4

5

6

very slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

18g) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
2
very slightly

3
slightly

4

5

a little

moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

18h) Let's say that this situation really happened to you -that is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others Involved in the situation?
1
not at all !,

5

6

7

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

18i) How much would you start looking more seriously for a relationship? i;.
4

6

a little

quite a bit

7
extremely
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18j) How much would you want to just avoid everyone and stay home?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

3
slightly

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

19a) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

19b) Let's say that this situation really happened to you -that is, you are (X). To what
you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation?
extent

do

1
not at au

4

5

a little

moderately

7
extremely

19c) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
1
not at all

4

5

a little

moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

19d) In this situation, to what exte~t does (X) if she were a typical female, come
across as possessing undesirable characteristics?
1
not at all

2

4

very slightly

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

19e) Let's say that this situation .really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what ,
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation?
1
not at all

4

a little

19f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the
situation "?
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1
not at all

3

5

6

&lightly

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

19g) How much would you want to apologize and make things right?

19h) How much would you not want to avoid going back to work?

191)How much would you think you're a mean and selfish person?
4

5

a little

moderately

19j) How much would you feel sorry for the problems your behavior has caused your
employer?
not at all

2

5

very slightly

moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

20a) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
5

2
very slightly

moderately

20b) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what
extent
you feel y~u "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation?

d9

3
slightly

4

a little

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

20c) How much would you avoid eye contact and want to just "disappear from the
elevator?
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4

a little

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

20d) Howmuch would you apologize to the woman for making her feel bad?
7
extremely

20e) In ths situation, to what extent would (X), If he were a typical male, come across
as possMSlng undesirable characteristics?
5
moderately

6
quite a blt

7
extremely

20f) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
4

5

6

a little

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

20g) Let'ssay that this situation really happened to (X), who Is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others Involved In the situation?
2
very slightly

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

1
extremely

20b) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved In the
situation?
1
not at all

5

6

7

moderately

quite a bit

extremely

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

5

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

moderately
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21a) In this situation, to what exent would (X), If he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable charccteristics?
1
not at all

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

21b) In this situation, to what exbnt does (X) if she were a typical female, come
across as possessing undesirabe characteristics?
4

5

a little

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

21c) Let's say that this situation ieally happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "caute trouble" for others involved In the situation?
1
not at all

3

4

5

slightly

a little

moderately

6

quite a bit

7
extremely

21d) Let's say that this situation ieally happened to (X), who is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical femal~ "cause trouble" for others involved in the
situation?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

3
slightly

4
a little

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

21e) How much would you apolo9ize over and over to your parents and try to sell the
stereo to get some of the money back?
1
not at all

2
very slightly

3
slightly

4
a little

5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

21f) How much would you avoid biking with your parents and discussing the
problem?
2

4

6

7

very slightly

a little

quite a bit

extremely

21g) In tt,is situation, to what exte:n~do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
5

6

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely
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21h) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation?
1
not at all

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

extremely

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

21i) How much would you feel like a bad son?
1
not at all

1
not at all

2
very slightly

7

22a) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across
as possessing undesirable characteristics?
3
slightly

4

a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

22b) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come
across as possessing undesirable characteristics?
5
moderately

7
extremely

22c) Let's say that this situation reJlly happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what
extent did this typical male "cause 'trouble" for others involved in the situation?

22d) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the
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situation?
5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

22e) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing
undesirable characteristics?
7
extremely

1
not at all

22f) Let's say that this situation really happened to you -that is, you are (X). To what
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation?
1
not at all

7
extremely

5
moderately

22g) How much would you call your friend and promise to stay up all night and help
him/her redo the paper?
4
a little

5
moderately

6
quite a bit

7
extremely

22h) How much would you avoid eye contact with your friend?
2

3

5

6

very slightly

slightly

moderately

quite a bit

7
extremely

22i) How much would you worry that your friend will think you're incompetent?
1
not at all

1
not at all

3

5

6

slightly

moderately

quite a bit

5
moderately

7
extremely

7
extremely
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The GR-TOSCA
NOTE: Pay close attention to the question number s. The y go from left to right .
Please write the last six digits of your student ID here: _

_

__

__

Please write your VERSION of GR-TOSCA: VER SION NUMBER

@

Are you male or femal e?

I a)

00

0 0 0 0 0

I c)

CD0 0 0 00

I e)

0

0 0 0 0

I b)

000

0

Id )

CD0 0 0 0 0 0

CD0 0 0 00

0

It)

CD0 0 0 0 0 0

l g)

00

0 0 00

0

I h)

00

0 0 0 0 0

I i)

00

0 0 0 0 0

Ij)

00

0 0 0 0 0

2a)

00

0 0 0 0 0

2b)

CD0 00

2c)

00

0 0 00

0

2d)

CD0 0 0 0 0 0

2e)

00

0 0 0 0 0

2t)

CD0 0 0 0 0 0

2g)

00

0 0 0 0 0

2h)

CD0 0 0 0 0 0

2i)

00

0 0 0 0 0

2j)

00

3a)

CD0 0 0 0 0 0

3b)

0000000

3c)

CD0 0 0 00

0

3d)

000

3e)

CD0 0 0 0 0 0

3t)

00

0 0 0 0 0

3g)

CD0 0 0 0 0 0

3h)

00

0 0 0 0 0

3i)

00

0 0 00

0

3j)

0000

4a)

00

00

0 0 0

4b)

0000000

4c)

00

0 0 0 0 0

4d)

CD0 0 0 0 0 0

4e)

CD0 0 0 0 0 0

4t)

CD0 0 0 0 0 0

4g)

CD0 0 0 0 0 0

4 h)

00

4 i)

000

4j )

0000

0 00

0

0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0
0 00
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Appendix C:

The BSRI
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DIRECTIONS:
Below ~ou will find listed a number of personality characteristics. We would like you
to use those characteristics to describe yourself, that Is; we would like you to
Indicate, on a scale from 1 to 7, how true of you each characteristic Is. Please do not
leave any characteristic unmarked.
EXAMPLE : sly

Fill in the bubble above 1 If it is never or almost never true that you are sly.
Fill in the bubble above 2 If it is usually not true that you are sly.
Fill In the bubble above 3 if it sometimes but infrequently true that you are sly
Fill in the bubble above 4 if it is occassionally true that you are sly.
Fill in the bubble above 5 if it is often true that you are sly

Fill in the bubble above 6 if it is usually true that you are sly.
Fill in the bubble above 7 If it is always or most always true that you are sly.
Thus, if you feel it is sometimes but infrequently true that you are "sly", never or almost
never true.that you are "malicious", always or almost always true that you are
"irresponsible", and often true that you are "carefree", then you would rate these
characteristics as follows:
Sly-3
Malicious - 1
Irresponsible - 7
Carefree-5
You will respond by filling in the bubbles on the answer sheet labeled BSRI. Please
do not skip any items -- rate all responses.
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1. Defend my own beliefs
2 Affectionate
3. Conscientious
4. Independent
5. Sympathetic
6. Moody
7. Assertive
y

8. Sensitive to needs of others
9. Reliable
10. Strong personality
11. Understanding
12. Jealous
13. Forceful
14. Compassionate

15. Truthful

,

16. Have leadership abilities
17. Eager to soothe hurt feelings
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18. Secretive

19. Willing to take risks
20. Warm

21. Adaptable
22. Dominant
23. Tender

24. Conceited
25. Willing to take a stand
26. Love children

27. Tactful
28. Aggressive
29 . Gentle
30. Conventional
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Appendix 0 :
The TOSCA-2
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DIRECTlONS:
Below are several situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life,
followed by several common reactions to those situations. As you read each
scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would
be to react in each of the ways described . We ask you to rate all responses because
people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react
different ways at different times.

For example:

l

t

'

,,~

~" f I t

,',
~)i.

"

q§ ~--;.,

,v

1·.: .d.,,;

11\d-

,.;11:n~,r

t>

1~·:~.:1r:ti

~ r

(a)

You would telephone a friend to
catch up on the news

1

2

3

4

5

(b)

You would take the extra time to
read the paper

1

2

3

4

5

(c)

You would feel disappointed that
it's raining

1

2

3

4

5

(d)

You would wonder why you woke
up so early

1

2

3

4

5

I

In the above example, I've rated ALL of the answer. I chose a "1" for answer (a)
because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday morning - so
it's not at all likely that I would do .that.
I chose a "5" for answer (b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in
the morning (very likely). I chose a "3" for answer (c) because for me it's about half
and half •.Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn't
- It would depend on what I had planned. And I chose a "4" for answer (d)because I
would probably wonder why I had awakened so early.
You will respond by filling In the bubbles on the answer sheet labeled TOSCA-2.
Please do not skip any items - rate all responses.
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I
1

4

You would think "I'm
Inconsiderate."

1

2

3

4

5

You would think "Well, they'll
understand."

1

2

3

4

5

1

3

4

5

1

3

4

You would think: "My boss
distracted me".

l

i '
>

'}

, •l

l f tf It t~

t

{ 't;'i;

'

0

•

1/'Q, '

'

You would think: "This is making
me anxious. I need to either fix it or
get someone else to."

(e)

3

1

5

1

5

For days you'd worry about it,
repeatedly trying to think of a way
to remedy the situation.

1

5

You think: "A lot of things aren't
made very well these days."

1

5

You would think: "It was only an
accident."

1

2

3

4

5
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1

2

You would feel happy with your
appearance and personality.

1

2

You would feel pleased to have
made such a good impression.
•c

y OUcan't stop thinking about the
problems you may have caused
your friend and their spouse.

You would probably avoid eyecontact for a long time.

3

l
I

1

I

2

•

I

I

3

I

5

4

5

-··
4

:

I

~:
i
1

T

4

5
~-

~-..!

;

II

2

-

3
II
If

4

5

5

l

3

4

1

2

3

4

You would feel: "I deserve to be
reprimanded for mismanaging the
project."

1

2

3

4

5

You would think: "What's done is
done."

1

2

3

4

5

'

(e)

3

2

•

(a)

i

1

• : '

'1

'- • '

, ,

'f'i i1~1f1rq.1· r('\

~

'

'

! ( . •:! '

1~·1; ;

• "<";:'.

l } ! ~.

"'

You'd bend over backwards for
months to make up for it but fear
that it won't make any difference.

'~

>

~

nl.
"

"

''

Ht'(
,,j

\

0

i

fi1;:,,,it~:
1( t ti 1 't; (I 1
1

j//
~

You would think the company did
not like the coworker.

·i

II

.You would think: "I should have
bQen·aware of what my best friend
is feeling."

l
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(d)

5

you would think: ,;Life is not fair."

1

You would keep quiet and avoid the
coworker.

1

4

5

You would feel troubled and
preoccupied with what happened
but unable to correct the situation.

1

4

5

You would feel unhappy and eager
to correct the situation.

1

4

5

4

5

(a)

You would think: "I guess I'm more
persuasive than I thought".

(b)

You would regret that you put it off.

(c)

You would feel like a coward.

(d)

You would think: "I did a good job."

(e)

You would feel badly about getting
off so easily and always feel
"funny" whenever you thought
about the call.
You would think you shouldn't have
to make calls you feel pressured
into.

You would feel Inadequate that you
can't even throw a ball.

1

2

3
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(b)

You would think maybe your friend
needs more practice at catching. ·

1

2

1
II

(e)

1

You would apologize and make sure
your friend feels better.

1

ii

5

4

5

I 4

5

3

2
i

You would think: "It was just an
accident."

4

f

l!

II

1

3

I

11

2

1·. 3

2

I

3

'•

I• 4
'

lli

5

I

You would think:"I sure ran into
some bad luck."
(c)

You would return the favor as
quickly as you could.

1

2

3

4

5

(d)

You would think: "I am a
trustworthy person."

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

You'd still never be able to forgive
yourself for putting your family out.

You would think the animal ·
shouldn't have been on the road.

1111111111
1

2

3

•I

4

5
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Youwould feel: "Well, it was'an
accident."
(d)

You'd have trouble getting the
image of the animal out of your
mind.
YQu'd feel bad you hadn't been
more alert driving down the road.

You wou ld th ink: "Well, it's just a
test.''
You would think: "The Instructor
doesn't like me."
You would think: " I should have
studied harder."

1

2

3

4
4

You keep thinking back to all of the
things you did wrong in preparing
for the exam.

You would feel the boss is rather
shortsighted.
You would feel alone and apart
from your colleagues.

3

4
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(c)

(f)

Yqu would feel your hard work paid

off

·

1

'." 2

I

~

::

You would feel competent and
proud of yourself.

1

You would feel you should not
accept it.

1

y~u'd feel compelled to find new
·wais each day to make it up to your
coworkers.

i ,12

::

'

I

2

4

5

3

4

5

3

4

5

3

4

5

3

I

-

•

1

'

L

I
2

I

:I

•

5

1

5
You would think that perhaps that
friend should have been there to
defend himself/herself.

1

2

4

5

You would berate yourself over and
over for it and vow never to do it
again.

1

2

4

5

(e)

You would apologize and talk about
that person's good points

1

2

4

5

(a)

You would think your boss should
have been more clear about what
was expected of you.

(c)

(d)
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(b)

t

You would walk around for days
kicking yourself, thinking of all the
mistakes you made.

1

You would feel like you wanted to
hide.

1

2

If ~-

1

I

Ii 3

"

I

I

2

4

s

3

4

5

3

4

5

2

I '

You would think: "Welf, nobody's
perfect"

1

;!1

""

II

(e)

17

I

II

You would think: "I should have
recognized the problem and done a
better job."

I

2

II

3

4

5

3

4

5

You would feel selfish and you'd
think you are basically lazy.
Every time you hear about the kids,
you get a gnawing feeling inside,
knowing how you almost let them
down.
You would feel you were forced into
doing something you did not want
todo.

would feel great that you had
helped others.

1

II

2

II
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You would think: "I am
irresponsible and incompetent."
(b)

You would think that your friend
must not take very good care of
their dog or it wouldn't have run
away.
You would feel badly every time
you saw a dog.
You would vow to be more careful
next time.
) You would think your friend could
just get'a new dog.

1

2

3

4

5

3

4

5

You think your coworker should
have expected some accidents at
such a big party.
(b)

You would stay late to help clean
up the stain after the party.

(c)

Every time you see your co-worker
you get a nervous feeling in the pit
of your stomach, thinking of that
stain on the carpet
You would wish you were anywhere
but at the party.
You would wonder why your
c9worker chose to serve red wine
with the new light carpet.

1

